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Introduction 
The role of language in our lives, our perceptions, and our knowledge has long been 
the subject of philosophical inquiry. A still-pervasive theme in the discourse on language 
revolves around the idea that meaning, that the content of our words and expressions, is 
grounded in that which they reference in the world. The word “rock” means what it does 
because there is a thing in the world, namely a rock, that the word ‘points to’ and 
consequently means. Contrastingly, in his ​Philosophical Investigations,​ Ludwig 
Wittgenstein argues that this reduction of language to representation cannot possibly 
encompass the whole of what we do with language. Wittgenstein emphasizes the point 
that there is no one thing that language simply ​is ​, no generalizable, “ultimate,” meaning 1
to our words, and that the human activity of language (the “form of life” ) is situated 2
within, is a part of, the regular activity of human life and, as such, a very large portion “​of 
cases of the employment of the word ‘meaning’—though not for all—this word can be 
explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.”   3
By elaborating the notion of meaning beyond the confines of mere representation, 
Wittgenstein opens the door for an understanding of the ‘mind-independent world’ that 
need not, at base, rely on the traditional picture of an ultimate reality composed of 
1 In section §23 of the ​Investigations​, Wittgenstein remarks that these, which are by no means 
encompassing (or even fractionally representative) of the diversity of our language, are the sort of thing we do 
with language: giving orders and acting on them, describing an object, speculating about an event, forming a 
hypothesis, making up a story, reading a story, acting, singing, guessing riddles, telling a joke, solving a 
problem, translating, requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying, &c. 
2 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations, §23. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953. Print. 
3 Investigations, §43 
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ultimate-things (of ‘things-in-themselves’).  By deposing the referential (denotative, 4
definitional, representational, &c.) picture of language and meaning, Wittgenstein 
prefigures a kind of anti-realist sentiment that allows for a discussion of things, meaning, 
knowledge, and emotion that will become the focus of this project.  
In the coming chapter I will review a line of skeptical argument that, as I intend to 
demonstrate, is manifest from an understanding of the objective world as stratified — as 
composed of individual pieces which I will typically refer to as “objects-in-themselves” for 
the idea of an entity that exists ​as​ an entity (as a bounded, discrete ‘thing’) fully 
independent of human cognition, can be restated as the idea of an object-in-and-of-itself, 
as an object that is so not through its conception within the human mind or the activity of 
language, but rather by virtue of itself alone. It is important to note that the skeptical 
argument I will present in the coming pages is neither meant to be indicative or 
representative of the diverse field of skeptical thought, but rather is intended to serve as a 
microcosm for a line of philosophical reasoning that remains pervasive, both implicitly and 
explicitly, within a great deal of philosophical discourse past and present. By evaluating 
what kind of idea ‘objects-in-themselves’ is, and what kind of picture of language it 
fosters, I will present an alternative understanding of objective reality (or rather, an 
alternative understanding of language through which the notion of objective reality can be 
seen to have no sensible place in ordinary discourse) that, with the help of Wittgenstein, 
4 Note here that the use of “mind-independent world,” “ultimate reality,” “objective reality,” &c. are 
all used interchangeably to indicate the idea of a fundamentally existent world — of what exists, not within the 
confines of human experience, but as the underlying (or, as I will sometimes say, “transcendent”) reality. This 
idea will be most often utilized in the context of my investigation into the notion of ‘things-in-themselves,’ 
which I will also refer to synonymously as “objects-in-themselves,” “objects-in-and-of-themselves,” “objects 
independent of human cognition,” and so on. 
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J.L. Austin, and Stanley Cavell, may rid us of the need to seek generality  and objectivity.  5
As with the cessation of any foundational belief, it will be important that we attend 
not only to the untenability of a referential mode but also to the gaps that are left when 
such thinking is abandoned. For example, it is vital that we establish an alternative 
understanding of the role of grammar, convention, and community such that we might 
make sense of the success, efficacy, &c. of language — and, importantly, how such 
concepts as ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ and ‘correctness’ remain sensible without the crutch of 
reference to anchor them. To this end Austin’s essay, in tandem with Wittgenstein’s 
notion of criteria (and Cavell’s invaluable examination of that notion), will let us discern 
something important about the role language plays in our ascriptions and expressions of 
experiential states. 
In the second chapter of this project I will reconcile the purported non-existence of 
ultimate constituent pieces of reality with the intuitive and seemingly self-evident 
existence of objects, of things, in our own lives. In an attempt to dissuade us from taking 
our own diversely populated perceptions to be indicative of a parallel, external reality 
likewise composed, I will examine how precisely we are trained in language and into a 
language-speaking community and then elaborate on this training with a discussion of the 
way language inflects the many ways we see and understand the world around us. This 
discussion is intended to provide a preliminary intuition for the way that our language 
training, and, as we will see, no less than our entire natural history as full-blooded human 
beings, consolidates a lens through which we perceive the world, perceive objects, 
5 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. ​The Blue and Brown Books (BB)​, 1. 1958, Oxford: Blackwell. 
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perceive emotion.  
This last brings us to the final chapter: an analysis of other minds, our ability to 
know them, and our capacity to see (recognize, call out, act on, &c.) the emotions of 
others. In order to explain such a contentious and superficially unintuitive idea as ‘the 
visibility of emotion’ I will begin by paraphrasing the thoughts of J.L. Austin from his 
essay ​Other Minds​. Having proceeded through the first two chapters, I hope by this point 
to have cultivated a budding understanding of the way that our training with language 
shapes our perceptions.  
In contrast to ​Other Minds​ though, I will attempt to undermine the “something 
special” that Austin ultimately sustains as a characteristic and troubling facet of our 
attempts to ‘know’ the emotion of others. This argument will take form in the thesis that 
behavior is honest ​and, however inadequate our perceptions and judgments of emotion in 
others may be — undoubtedly we are often wrong or, at least, reductive in our attempts to 
recognize the emotions of those around us — such errors (if we could call them that) are a 
reflection of 1). The nuance and complexity of felt-experience (relative to the blunt and 
often reductive character of linguistic expressions) and 2). The informationally rich 
contextual details, personal relationships, and natural histories that are sometimes more 
and sometimes less integral to our perceptions, assessments, judgments, ascriptions, &c. 
of the emotion of others.  
An aside: ​I expect that at this moment it will seem a far leap to equate our 
“assessment” of someone’s emotion with our “perception” of it, however, this language is 
vitally important to the views I will be presenting — As I mentioned before, the second 
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chapter will be devoted to the idea that perception is not the passive reception of sense 
data and rather that language (and, for that matter, our entire natural history) inflects 
(constitutes?) the way we see and interact with the world: The talented musician may 
hear the individual notes, chords; the learned painter may see the world in its composite 
colors; the language-proficient reader can see the words on the page, the sentences, the 
meaning (and not, say, squiggles of ink on a page or, even more primitively, a splotched 
mess of black and white).  
As such, I will be arguing for the notion that our training with language and other 
relevant cultural and social practices facilitates, literally, the perception of emotion in 
others. The tiredness of the student with the slowly shutting eyes, the nodding head, and 
slumped posture, can be seen as much as the chair he sits in. ​Thus it is no accident that 
our discussion will focus on Wittgenstein’s ideas about symptoms and criteria as well as 
those on ascriptions of emotion. that locutions about emotion (“I’m happy” or “I think he’s 
in pain”) are ​expressions ​of that emotion, as much as any behavior (scratching at an area 
as an expression of feeling itchy, for example) is.  
This will likely come up again but, to clarify, I am not asserting that we are 
somehow capable of ​introspecting​ the emotion of another person — obviously, except in 
highly special empathetic circumstances, we do not share the quality of their experience. 
Rather, the decisive point is that the quality of the experience of anger simply fails to 
encompass all of what we mean by “anger,” all of what ‘anger’ is. Anger has rich and 
varied cultural connotations, it is deeply seated within the context of an individual’s life 
(they have their own connotations, associations, &c. for anger), it is a piece of language 
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with a particular pronunciation, it is a part of numerous idiomatic expressions, it is used 
for blackmail and persuasion (“You wouldn’t like me when I’m angry”) — Anger is a 
radically more detailed and rich concept than its phenomenology can hope to account for. 
When I say that we see the bored student, it is not because I am somehow literally feeling 
bored by looking at him, but simply this: He is bored! The wandering eyes, the vacant 
dissociated expression; these things are all part of what boredom is (as much as the feeling 
of boredom), and by virtue of my training with language ‘boredom’ and the presentation of 
these criteria facilitate my perception of ‘bored’ — and no less the fact that I am in a 
classroom, that there is a teacher, that this person has a backpack, &c. all inform me that 
this is a student!  
Given the general layout of each chapter to come I hope it is clear that the topics to 
be covered, while distinct, are interwoven and depend upon one another in important 
ways. The skeptical argument serves to highlight a particular kind of presupposition 
common to certain strains of analytic argument such that we might inspect our 
assumptions about reference and reality. This is exemplified in the notion of 
objects-in-themselves which, once sufficiently disassembled, provides us a kind of 
ontological ‘blank slate’ whereupon we can begin to piece together a view of language and 
the world that needn’t be tethered to any notion of essence, objective reality, referent, &c. 
As we establish this, at least in a preliminary way, we will then move into an examination 
of perception — through what some would call an ‘embodied cognition framework  — as 6
6 While I will not spend much time contextualizing the picture of language and perception that I put 
forward, it is worth briefly noting that there is much in common with and inspired by the scientific and 
philosophical notion of embodied cognition. Specifically, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s ​Philosophy in the 
Flesh​ has remained a touchstone for my thinking over the years despite the relative independence of their work 
from that of Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell. 
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constructive: powerfully manifest from physical context of our bodies and deeply inflected 
by our history in the world (notable in that history is, of course, language). By discussing 
our language training we might also elaborate a notion of convention, regulation, and 
grammar, that can account for many of the concepts (truth, accuracy, success, to name a 
few) commonly taken to be indicative of ‘things-in-themselves,’ ‘objective reality,’ 
‘meaning as reference,’ &c. It is only then, after arriving at the two primary viewpoints of 
the previous chapters and, more importantly, that our discussion of emotion will be 
properly contextualized.  
Finally, there are many ways in which the resources of language, in Wittgenstein’s 
words, “bewitch us.” My own writing is of course no exception and there are a great deal 
of instances where the language I must rely upon to convey some idea or intuition belies 
(and in some cases even contradicts) my overall aims. I will make an effort going forward 
to preface such instances as they appear, however, there are cases in which the denial of 
contradictory or hypocritical rhetoric seems to inescapably result in such opaque linguistic 
contortions as the previously mentioned, “objects-in-and-of-themselves,” and thus some 
combination of the two must be made use of in order to adequately and least bemusingly 
convey these ideas. 
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I. Objects and Skepticism 
 
1 Organic Doubt on Uncertain Ground 
Years ago I was wandering the premises of the nature reserve, aptly called “the 
sanctuary,” at the boarding school I attended. At my side was a close friend with whom I 
had often discussed the many perplexities of my youth. One day in particular I had been 
considering a previous conversation we had and was suddenly struck by an odd thing. In 
this earlier conversation we were discussing the ever-contentious death penalty, the 
ethical ramifications of taking someone’s life, the seeming hypocrisy of violent punishment 
for violent crime, the possibility that the mere existence of the penalty, the threat of death, 
serves as a valuable disincentive for would-be criminals, and so on. Whatever the 
conclusion of the discussion was, what I recall most distinctly was the simple fact that my 
position, following our conversation, had changed. Certainly this should not seem so odd, 
but, somehow in the particular context of my life at that moment, during that walk, I was 
devastated by that reality. My views on this topic had fundamentally shifted. What I 
found so startling, so unsettling, was the sudden realization that — if my beliefs change, 
have changed, and will in all likelihood, given all available evidence, continue to change — 
how, in light of the suddenly apparent ephemerality of my beliefs, could I claim certainty, 
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in the views that I held now? Perhaps this cursory, adolescent formulation of an age old 
philosophical theme is not ultimately tenable, but the lived experience itself indicates to us 
something of the nature of the skeptical problem, of the felt urgency that skeptical thought 
demands. We can see here that philosophical skepticism is not merely the product of 
esoteric philosophizing, alien to real human experience, and ought not be dismissed as 
such. However, if we are to understand what the skeptic puts forward and why it falls on 
deaf ears, we should first more clearly dissemble the scaffolding of her argument.  
Before proceeding further, it is worth noting that philosophical skepticism takes 
many and variegated forms. The example that we will be examining is only one of many 
brands of skepticism and I have no intention of claiming that our breed of skepticism can 
stand for all arguments in the rich skeptical tradition. That being said, in our evaluation 
we will uncover an ultimately fatal assumption present in the skeptic’s argument that I 
believe endemic to much of skeptical thought and beyond. That is, our investigation into a 
particular characterization of skepticism stands to highlight a way of thinking about 
language that, as will be argued further on, is both philosophically misbegotten and yet 
pervasive among both old and contemporary discourse.  
In the traditional skeptic’s argument the claim “that is an apple” is met with the 
request for a basis, such as “I can see it in plain view in front of me.” This basis is then 
confronted with a grounds for doubt, such as “your experience with what you are 
perceiving to be an apple could in actuality just be taking place within a dream, in which 
case really there would be no apple,” or “your basis for knowing there is an apple in front 
of you is that you see it, but you do not see all of it, you do not see the back or inside, so 
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how can you ​know​ it is an apple?,” or “the perception of a curved stick in water does not 
warrant ‘knowledge’ that the stick is curved, so how could the sight of the apple constitute 
knowledge that it is indeed an apple?” While ‘on the inside’ of a dream there are no 
discernible qualities distinguishing the dream from real life — having had experiences 
where, upon awakening, I mused “That dream was so realistic that I had no idea I was in 
a dream,” it is the kind of naturally occurring doubt which in the Cartesian sense stands 
as sensible. The force of this is something like: I am unjustified in making the claim “that 
is an apple in front of me,” or “I know that is an apple,” because, in reality, I am (could 
be) dreaming; I am (could be) seeing only a cardboard facsimile of an apple, a projection of 
an apple, and so on. That is to say, the possibility of dreaming means I do not actually 
know and so am not justified in my knowledge claim. And, with the ultimate qualification 
that we take a ‘best possible case’ of knowledge (the apple is in plain view, in broad 
daylight, I am unimpaired, &c.) entails that, if we can not know here, then we can not 
know ​anywhere​. Surely if, in the most clear case of our knowing something, it is proven 
that we merely ‘believe,’ then in all descending cases of more ambiguous, less clearly-cut 
knowledge, we must also be laboring under a delusion. 
The skeptic wants to say that if there exists the slightest ground for doubt, then 
there cannot be certainty, only belief — that, if doubt is still present in an ideal case, then 
we cannot have certainty ​generally​. Undoubtedly the argument for the inadequacy of 
sensation is a convincing one, we have all experienced from time to time the fallibility of 
our senses, our memories; more than once I have been out for a walk at night only to work 
myself up by misjudging a tree to be a person (did I judge the tree to be a person or did I 
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see the tree as a person?). The skeptic uses the occasional failure of our sensory 
judgments as a demonstration of the principled barrier between the observer and the 
observed, the perception and the thing-perceived. In doing so the skeptic thus draws on a 
familiar intuition, one that has been held by philosophers since antiquity: From Plato’s 
distinction between form and essence and Aristotle’s “object itself” versus its 
“hylomorphic form” to Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities and, 
popularizer of philosophical skepticism himself, Descartes’ epistemological dualism. So 
what does this distinction hold? What is it that we lack when it is said that we merely 
perceive the form and not the ‘object itself’? If, as the skeptic portends, this lack entails a 
lack of entitlement to knowledge, to certainty, then what is the certainty that the skeptic 
seeks?  
When looking at an apple on a table, in clear view, I cannot, the skeptic says, 
justifiably claim “I know that’s an apple” because, surely, it could be a cardboard 
representation, a mere facsimile of an apple. What, then, if I walk the perimeter of the 
table, viewing the apple from many different directions? Not so, the skeptic replies, that 
could simply be a convincing plastic apple. As long as there is the possibility, however 
remote, of being wrong (“It ​could​ be plastic”) then certainty is out of the question. What 
if I pick the apple up, feel its weight and, more, cut into the  cut into it revealing the 
apple’s flesh? Surely ​this ​must be an apple, I must be justified in saying “now I ​know​ this 
is an apple.” Alas, the skeptic is again prepared: That is merely a lab-made facsimile of an 
apple, possessed of nearly identical weight and texture but nonetheless not an apple — 
apples grow on trees! If this, which from all angles appears to be an apple, which feels like 
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an apple, has an apple’s flesh, and so on; if this is not an apple, then what is an apple? 
Then what does it mean to be an apple? With this line of questioning I hope to highlight 
some of the queerness present in the skeptic’s notion of what a ‘thing’ is, of what makes 
an apple, an ‘apple,’ and not a lab-made facsimile. I hope to inject some hesitation into our 
willingness to accept the conventional notion that object identity is black and white, apple 
and not-apple, such that we might glean some of the haziness in the scaffolding of the 
skeptic’s argument; such that the clean edges bounding the apple from the not-apple come 
out of focus and begin to reveal a far more vaporous sense of what an ‘apple’ ‘is.’ While at 
this point the intuition is inchoate at best, the strangeness of the skeptic’s answers as we 
delve farther and farther down the rabbit hole of sensation and knowledge, prefigures the 
discussion to come and relates where we will ultimately find the proverbial kink in the 
skeptic’s armor.  
 
2 The Lived-in World 
In the course of clarifying the force of the skeptic’s argument and specifically the 
sense of the certainty and knowledge that the skeptic seeks (that is, in clarifying what it is 
that the skeptic thinks we lack when she says “we cannot be certain”), I hope to 
demonstrate that the skeptic’s world is not the world we ​live ​in. And, though we have 
seen it is possible for philosophical doubt to arise organically, that doubt arises out of a 
muddled intuition for the workings of language. In the first pillar of this philosophical 
project I will set out to undo the intuition that there exists an objectively stratified 
external reality. That is, I will demonstrate the lack of sense in presuming ‘singularness’ 
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(objects, distinct entities, discreteness &c.) to exist in reality outside of human cognition; I 
hope to clarify that ‘objects’ as distinct, singular entities are a powerful but ultimately 
human construction and one that does not transpose onto the ‘external’ world.. To clarify 
the emphasis here, I am working to show that the characteristic unity, singularity, 
individuality, &c. of ‘objects’ is a function of the language that describes them — that is, I 
will argue that identity (what makes the ‘apple’ an apple and not, say, a plastic replica) 
does not inhere in the object (nothing about the apple itself individuates it from the 
universe around it) but of the behavior, practice, and conventions of language use. This 
may seem like an esoteric point at first, certainly the language I must resort to in 
describing it is obscure, but the notion of a stratified external reality has its roots in 
ancient history and remains pervasive today among realist schools of thought and is, as 
we have seen in the skeptic’s argument, an unspoken assumption in a greater number still. 
Plato’s forms jump to mind as an obvious example of the belief that, outside of human 
perception, there exist ultimate Entities which transcend human perception. However a 
far more subtle and troubling example lies in the still-pervasive ‘referential theory of 
meaning’ which describes the relationship between language and the world as denotative; 
the word is merely a tag placed onto some ‘thing’ that exists outside of the language that 
describes it. Suffice it to say, the idea that there exists an external reality populated by 
entities is monolithic, tacitly-accepted or intuited, and, as we shall see, woefully 
misbegotten. The sense in which there exists an Objective Reality at all is, to some extent, 
problematic, but the specific brand nonsense that I wish to highlight lies in the 
characterization of an external reality composed of constituent ​parts​, of a world outside of 
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language that is carved up into individual ‘things.’  
On the surface it would appear that there is a sense in which the argument that I 
will be making is its own kind of skepticism, perhaps even a more radical form than the 
kind I wish to deconstruct. To answer this let us first look to Wittgenstein for a sense of 
context. In his ​Philosophical Investigations ​Wittgenstein paints a picture of language, 
how we use it, and how the concept of ‘meaning’ is seated within the complex web of 
those language games, that posits no ​theory ​of language. There is no, as has sometimes 
been falsely attributed to him, ‘use theory of meaning.’ Rather, through a myriad of 
ground-floor instances of language, Wittgenstein establishes an understanding of how a 
language-speaking community, through convention and use, confers meaning — ​life​ — to 
the words that populate our language. Similarly, in this project I hope to consolidate a 
sense of ​the way language works​; a sense of knowledge and certainty, of the ​concepts​ of 
‘knowledge’ and ‘certainty,’ of ‘objectivity’ and ‘perception,’ that diffuses some of the 
mystery in language which impels the so-called “problems of philosophy.” Among the 
problems and misconceptions that I wish to dissolve is the antiquated, platonic notion of 
objects or concepts as existent external to the human mind or the activities 
(meaning-making practices) of humanity. To construct a “theory” of perception, meaning, 
or language would typically mean to propose a system that explains what meaning ​is​. In 
his ​Philosophical Investigations ​Wittgenstein compels us to understand that “theorizing,” 
in this sense, is a misbegotten activity — a relic of Platonic essentialism and the attempt 
to ‘get at’ the fundamental, underlying nature of things. This project is not an attempt to 
formulate a theory about meaning or perception. Neither is it an opinion on the existence 
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or non-existence of objective entities. “But wait!” you may, quite appropriately, be 
thinking, “did he not just say precisely that?” Yes, and no — I will likely seem to 
contradict myself with some frequency in the coming text but, as I will speak in greater 
detail about later, there are constraints imposed by language that, simply because 
language is the medium through which I must communicate, I am confined by. For the 
moment I will briefly say that, yes, the picture of language that I wish to establish renders 
the notion of fundamentally existent entities obsolete. And superficially the statement 
‘there are no Objects in external reality’ is  radically skeptical but in understanding the 
full force of my argument we will see that what I am saying is the ​concept​ of ‘objects’ does 
not ​belong​ in a discussion of the universe external to human cognition. That is, when 
taken skeptically, the force of the claim imparts a kind of shock — that, to say this, is akin 
to saying ‘when I close my eyes the universe stops existing’ or ‘we are all a figment of our 
own imaginations’ or some equally strident, sententious nonsense. Rather, in establishing 
how our meaning-making practices police and reform the boundaries of language use; 
what ‘objects’ ‘are’; and a more ordinary, down-to-earth vision of perception, it ought to 
be clear that talk of an entity that is bounded, distinct, individual &c. in some fundamental 
way, is simply meaningless — ‘language on holiday.’  
Both the skeptic and myself are, ultimately, making the claim that there is a kind of 
certainty which is fundamentally unattainable. On this point, I do not fault the skeptic. 
However, in concluding that the unreliability of sensation indicates a fundamental inability 
for us to attain true knowledge, we are, along with the skeptic, made to lament this as a 
profound loss. The intended force of the skeptical argument is something like, “alas, we 
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can never have certainty at all but only belief.” The skeptic argues aptly that sensation 
cannot get at the ​thing-itself​ and so we can only ever infer, or place faith in, our sensation 
based beliefs. The skeptic intimates a kind of ‘leap-of-faith’ that must be taken anytime we 
place weight on our perceptions. I, too, argue that the kind of knowledge, the sense of 
certainty, that the skeptic seeks is fundamentally unattainable but in contrast to the 
skeptic, I hope to show that this is a meaningless conclusion. ​We do not live in the 
skeptic’s world​. The skeptic fights perception in the quest to disprove certainty whereas I 
believe that the skeptic is seeking such a peculiar kind of certainty, one that imports an 
ultimately untenable ontology, that its loss carries no weight. Namely, for us to have the 
kind of knowledge the skeptic wants is for us to know the thing-in-itself (as opposed to 
merely having a sensory impression from which we guess at the thing-in-itself); this sense 
of certainty necessitates the existence of a stratified external reality. This should not be 
surprising, for there to exist things-in-themselves is for there to be things — individual, 
bounded entities — independent of any human cognition or practice: An underlying, 
objective universe composed of objective things, of things-in-themselves, that our sensory 
perceptions only fallibly represent and (‘unfortunately’)  do not ​get at​.  7
However, if the characteristic of ‘singularness,’ of being bounded — ‘one’ — is 
itself of linguistic origin, if the unique sensory modalities and neurophysiological faculties 
that humans have evolved, and so too the development of language based communication, 
have resulted in the ​perception ​of a divided world but one that is not ​in-itself ​divided, then 
7 This is the loss that the skeptic laments, this is the intended force of the skeptical argument and thus 
too the precise place that my argument diverges. I argue against the possibility of ‘objects’ ​as singular entities 
outside of language but only insofar as it is a linguistic impossibility — it is not a loss because there was never 
anything to lose, ​per se.  
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the skeptic’s argument has no ground to stand on. In the coming text we shall gestate on 
the notion that our language games, including the practices and conventions surrounding 
such philosophically laden terms as ‘knowledge’ and ‘certainty,’ have appropriate contexts 
of employment and thus meaning that is deeply grounded in the customs and conventions 
of the language-speaking community and ​not​ some underlying or transcendent state of 
affairs. To lose the kind of knowledge that the skeptic wants is only to lose grounding in 
an already alien way of speaking — only to lose a sense devoid of context. 
 
T​he skeptic desires that we conclude, in not having this 'certainty,' that we've lost 
the ​ordinary ​sense of certainty. That is, rather than stretching a sense of certainty to its 
breaking point and reconvening on a (not-objective, everyday, &c.) certainty, the intended 
power of the skeptic’s argument resides in the implication that we have lost all certainty; 
certainty generally; the possibility for certainty (in our day to day life) —  he might say, 
“We can only ever take leaps of faith! We are perpetually rolling the dice of idle 
speculation as we proceed through life" However, the skeptic’s sense of certainty is highly 
specialized, seeking something that our senses cannot in principle provide: Access to the 
thing-in-itself. We cannot pull up the curtain past ‘mere’ perception to see the ultimate 
constituents of reality (were there ultimate constituents of reality, objects-in-themselves) 
with which the skeptic concludes the unattainability of certainty, as though we can so 
thoughtlessly equate ‘perception of the thing in itself, knowledge of the objective state of 
reality’ with the many and varied uses of ‘certainty.’ Further, as will be argued later in 
this chapter, objects-in-themselves are a relic of essentialist and referentialist thinking and 
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as such the sense of 'knowledge' cultivated by the skeptic is so specialized that it (and so 
too, the loss of it) has no force. We have merely made transparent the vapidity of 
Wittgenstein’s “language on holiday.” 
 
 
3 A Sense of Certainty 
In ordinary usage, both the question “Is there actually… ?” (“Is there actually 
going to be a celebrity speaker at the convention?” “Is this actually your paper and not a 
cleverly guised plagiarism?” &c.) as well as the statement “There is actually…” (“There is 
actually no such thing as Santa Claus”) are justifiable, uncontroversial. Let us imagine 
that, in her considerable comic genius, my housemate takes it upon herself to replace the 
cups in our house with superficially identical objects that have holes in their bottoms and 
hence cannot hold any liquid. For weeks following the incident, as she holds a cup out to 
me, I cautiously ask “is that actually a cup?” My words are sensible and my question can 
be answered sensibly. I am concerned that, while the object held out to me looks like a 
cup, it might instead be (a cup with holes in it) a practical joke designed to spill water on 
me. I use the word ‘actually’ because there is a sense in which the reliability of the 
superficial characteristics of the object, the cup, has been called into question. In contrast 
to the demonstrated, perpetually reinforced reliability of the many ‘identity judgments’  8
we make on a daily basis, my roommate has forced me into a position of hesitation in my 
8 Identity judgments needn’t be verbal, like “that is a cup,” in fact they far more realistically, and 
commonly, take for in our behavior; in, for example, my pouring a liquid into what I am judging, assuming, &c. 
to be a cup. When I ask a friend for a pencil and he reaches into his bag and hands me one, there are implicit 
identity judgments being made and, as I do not correct his actions, I tacitly reinforce those judgments as 
correct, reliable.  
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cup-related judgments, at least while I’m at home. 
This hesitation, this holding off from judgment, is a sensible, if temporary, 
response to the antics of my roommate. The skeptic poses her problem as such: Here I am 
skeptical, reluctant to judge, hesitant to act with certainty, &c. because I have been given 
reason to doubt the reliability of the superficial characteristics of the cup as being 
indicative of the object actually being a cup — the morphic qualities of the cup, in this 
context, no longer reliably entail the identity of the cup, if instead I were given reason to 
doubt the reliability of not just one identity judgment but rather the ascertainment of 
identity generally then I would be compelled to carry this same hesitation, this wary 
acknowledgement of the inconclusiveness of perceptory-judgment indiscriminately into 
life.  
 The sense of certainty employed by the philosopher in the above thought exercise 
relies on a notion of an underlying reality — when Plato asks “what is justice? (but what 
is ​Justice​?)” he does not seek a definition or a context of appropriate use, rather he seeks 
an ​essence​. Plato asks a different question than that of the curious child wondering what 
“justice” means (to which the parent might respond “Justice is treating people fairly”) — 
rather Plato, and a great many other philosophers, ask such questions with a very 
peculiar, existential sense in mind. When the philosophical skeptic makes the claim that 
there is a principled inadequacy in using our sensory perception of ‘X’ as the justification 
for knowledge of ‘X’ she demonstrates an underlying, untenable assumption: That there is 
some ​thing​, ‘X,’ beyond the boundaries of our perception. The skeptic does not mean to 
say, for example, that “no, in this case, seeing isn’t good enough because actually X was a 
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3-dimensional projection, you merely needed to reach out and touch it to know!” Rather, 
the skeptic makes the claim that ​no​ perceptory judgment would be adequate for, quite 
simply: The perception of X — the image of X, the taste of X, the smell of X and so on — 
is not X itself, does not entail X.  We do not see beyond the veil. If we are missing 
something, namely: ‘X,’ in not seeing beyond the veil, then the skeptic is unavoidably 
making the claim that there is an ‘X’ “beyond the veil,” outside of perception, independent 
of human consciousness, &c. Let this be the locus of the skeptic’s failing for it is precisely 
this claim, that there exist objects in and of themselves, entities independent of human 
cognition, that I refute, “​since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain” 
(​PI,​ 126). 
 
4 Lines in Language: The Regulation of Concepts  
 Within the frame of conscious experience we have come to categorize and classify 
the world around us. Through my training with language, my training with music, &c.  I 
have come to intuitively perceive discrete entities within my environment; I look around 
my room and see a chair, a bookshelf, a sleeping dog; I hear a song by Nick Drake, a 
particular chord, in ¾ time. This capacity, while profound and worthy of discussion in its 
own right, contributes fatally to an intuition that many of us carry — the chair, the song, 
will go on being a chair and a song when I am no longer there, right? The seeming nature 
of the objects in our world as hermetically sealed, ontologically distinct entities is an 
intuitive but fully human construction. While sometimes an inconsequential assumption, 
within the diaphanous territory of philosophical discourse the tacit presupposition of 
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objects-in-themselves can carry ruinous weight.  
Is the cup still a cup when no one is around to call it one? Does the fact that there 
are currently, let me count, seventy-seven things in this room mean there are, objectively 
seventy-seven objects in this room? The Eskimo, ostensibly due to the unique needs and 
qualities of their arctic environment, have twelve words for snow. Peering out of a 
window at a fresh snowfall, certain tribes of Eskimo may look at what we see as ‘snow,’ 
one thing, and instead see ‘aput’ and ‘qimuqsuq,’ two fully distinct entities. We would 
neither say that this entails the human-independent existence of twelve different things 
(which we happen to collate into ‘snow’), nor that the distinctions of identity which the 
Eskimo make are false ‘really’ there is objectively just one thing, ‘snow’ — We must 
avoid the trap of thinking that language reflects the objective contents of reality. 
The ‘lines’ that we draw, the words that we create and use to relate our 
experience, are not the result of an individual person but of an entire language speaking 
community that enforces the boundaries of use of our concepts. A concept is not merely 
the word but the entire system of use, misuse, connotation, association, regulation and so 
on that all together gives ​life​ to the concept. Language is a regulatory practice and the 
boundaries of our concepts, which are the lines that ‘carve up our world,’ so to speak, only 
exist insofar as they are policed and reinforced by the entire language speaking 
community. The possible rightness and wrongness of our claims does not derive from, as 
we have seen, their adherence to some underlying actuality, some ‘object-in-itself,’ but 
rather is a product of the claim’s harmony or disharmony with the language speaking 
community at large.  
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Language, in providing humans with a lens through which we see the ‘carved up’ 
world (through which you see these ​words ​and not just squiggles of black ink), engenders 
the dangerous intuition that there must exist objects outside of our conception of them; 
objects in and of themselves. “Surely,” this intuition impels, “the fact that are a myriad of 
distinct, singular things all around me,” the cup, glasses, computer, table, and so on, “is 
not going to change if I were not here” Undoubtedly the room and its contents would not 
somehow vanish upon our departure, this is not the force of our claim; rather we must ask 
whether it still exists ​as​ a room; whether the keys and cup on the desk still exist ​as​ keys 
and a cup, as ​separate entities​ independent of human cognition. Is there something 
fundamental about the cup that distinguishes it from its surroundings? Bounds it, 
separates it from ‘the desk’? The items surrounding me have identity, they are individual, 
one — were you to ask me for the cup I would not smash the cup and hand you a fragment 
of glass — but this perceived unity does not inhere in the universe. The associations and 
impressions that I have of sunglasses, their grammatical schematism in language, carve 
them out and make them ​‘one.’ ​Their identity, their one-ness, comes not from some 
vaporous ‘actuality,’ but from consciousness and the meaning making practice of 
language. 
 
5 Becoming a Rock 
We call these hard, often jagged things “rocks” though there is nothing that 
inheres in them which conveys the phonetically arbitrary “rock.” What would it mean for 
there to be some ​thing​ that the rock objectively is (onto which the name “rock” is merely a 
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tag)? That is, when the skeptic intimates the distinction between the perception and the 
thing-perceived (the image and the actuality, &c.), what would it mean for there to be 
such mind-independent entities; for reality outside of human consciousness to be stratified, 
composed of individual things? If there are ultimate constituents of reality which beget the 
identity, unity, ‘one-ness,’ &c. of our words (“rock,” “cup”) and the objects chained to 
them then let us seek it out. If there is some essence of ‘rockness’ from which the rock 
derives its identity or some ultimate building block of reality that is fundamentally ​one​, 
objectively individuated, then let us try to find it.  
The rock is an amalgam of elements crystallized, eroded, smashed together and, 
ultimately, culminated in the rock. For there to be some objective thing that a rock ​is​, then 
we ought to be able to triangulate that essence of ‘rockness’ by examining the transition 
from what is plainly not a rock to what definitively is. The amalgam of sand, gravel, &c. 
is certainly not a rock, while the final state of the rock certainly is: If there is some 
essence of ‘rockness,’ if the rock is objectively a rock and its identity, its one-ness, is not 
merely a human construction, then we should be able to ascertain that identity by 
examining how the lava, gravel, sand, &c. ‘become a rock.’ Were we to investigate what it 
means for something to be alcoholic by examining a number of different beverages, 
non-alcoholic and alcoholic; were we to watch as a glass of soda goes from non-alcoholic 
to alcoholic as whiskey is poured into the glass, or tonic as gin is mixed in, we would 
discover some commonality to all of these instances of ‘alcoholic’ that is missing in all 
instances of ‘non-alcoholic,’ and in examining the transition of a beverage from one to the 
other we clearly see that indeed, surprisingly, it is the alcohol which makes the beverage 
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alcoholic. In this vein, if there is some essence or ultimate object that manifests the rock’s 
identity (that makes the rock a rock and not, say, sand) then let us attempt a similar 
triangulation of such an essence or ultimate property. A perhaps unnecessary 
foreshadowing: If instead the identity of the rock, the cup, or a game, does not correspond 
to some essence that transcends perception, is not manifest from an objective constituent 
of reality ‘hidden from view,’ but rather is the far more ordinary consequence of “family 
resemblance” then we will find our search both fruitless and misguided.  
If we were to watch a timelapse of sand or mineral gradually coalescing into a rock 
and point out the moment when it is no longer sand but now rock, we would find no divine 
objectivity in our judgment – instead we find a nebulous, intersubjective  intuition that 9
guides us to a vaporous, desultory conclusion. The act of calling out a moment as the 
transition from not-a-rock to a-rock is fully interpolative. We would say with certainty 
that at first there is no rock, and at the end there is a rock, but the ‘moment of 
instantiation,’ as it were, would be nowhere to be found. Or, if found, the moment would 
vary from person to person, thus providing no insight into what makes the rock ‘a rock.’ 
There is no a-priori line through which the rock passes from being layers of slowly 
eroding and compressing earth into what we see as rock-dom. The boundaries of identity 
are organic, of human origin, often bearing only family resemblance, and manifest through 
9 By “intersubjective” here I mean to say that our understandings of words, what they ‘mean’ to each 
of us, how they are grammatically schematized for each of us, is both unique and shared. There is an important 
subjectivity to our individual lexicons insofar as every individual has a fully idiosyncratic natural history, a 
unique ‘training with language’ that shapes and inflects their understandings of every concept populating their 
idiolex. That said, there is also important overlap in our understandings of words that results from the 
regulatory practices of language: the conventions, customs, and traditions, that shape how we learn and use 
language enable the our effective communication. If we all had radically unique lexicons which little or no 
commonality the entire enterprise of effective communication would be undermined. 
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the learning, teaching, and policing of our language. 
 
6 Seeking Certainty 
Does this mean then that we are wrong in our certainty? That we ought not claim 
'to know’ that at first there is no rock and that at the end there is a rock? Perhaps we are 
fully justified in being ‘certain’ about there not being a rock and then, later, being a rock, 
perhaps instead the problem lies in the notion that there is some underlying actuality by 
virtue of which the “rock” is a rock, some essence beneath the surface of perception that 
gives the rock identity. If the rock is a rock not with reference to objective reality, but 
rather because of the deep grammatical schematism of ‘rock’ through our training with 
language, then there is no problem in our not finding an objective transition from 
‘non-rock’ to ‘rock;’ there would be no essence of rockness objectively because everything 
that a rock ‘is,’ what ‘rock’ ‘means,’ would be in plain sight and publicly available. The 
ambiguity of identity that seems to be implied in relinquishing ourselves from the grasp of 
referential meaning appears problematic (“How then can we have real Truth if there is no 
stratified objective reality?”). Language, unlike math or science, is an informal system—a 
system that warrants adaptation and reform, a form of life that is policed, regulated, but 
not so unyieldingly as in the context of mathematics or, for example, chess.  
It is readily available, plainly evident, that our words function effectively. We can 
speak of ‘truth,’ ‘knowledge,’ and ‘certainty’ in a variety of contexts with full 
understanding. To frame the question of ‘truth’ differently, let us look to J.L. Austin. 
Austin inquires about the truth of the statement “France is hexagonal.” He writes that, to 
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the war general who needs a vague sense of the geography of France in order to formulate 
appropriate orders to his men, “France is hexagonal” is a perfectly acceptable 
characterization of France’s shape and thus, to the general, the statement is true. On the 
other hand, Austin writes, the cartographer who is precisely mapping the entire region 
would call the claim “rough” at best and perhaps even “totally false.” What Austin 
intends to highlight by this is the tremendous importance of ​context​ in evaluating the 
meaning of a statement, in ​understanding​ the statement. In one situation the claim is true, 
in another it is false, but more to the point: it’s ​complicated​. The claim may be rough, 
vague, vaporous, &c.; the claim may be an attempt to get under someone’s skin; the claim 
might be a part of a memorization exercise — The ‘meaning’ of the claim is no simple 
thing and the attempt to reduce it, to generalize about it, to extricate its so-called “truth 
value” is an absurdly, uniquely philosophical mistake. This point, the contextual 
complexity of meaning, is essential for it shows us not only another sense in which the 
attempt to generalize meaning, or ‘get at’ the Truth, is faulty, but also provides us with 
picture of the way that the ordinary concepts of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘certainty,’ and so on 
fully retain their sense and weight despite the nonexistence of the skeptic’s general, 
idealized sense of ‘knowledge.’  I will reiterate that this is the place where the skeptic and 
I deviate. The skeptic concludes that, as we cannot have the knowledge, the certainty, she 
seeks, our capacity for certainty and knowledge ​generally​ is undermined. Whereas I 
recognize the unattainability of this ‘knowledge’ only as an inability to employ an already 
alien concept. Truth and knowledge are regularly employed competently in a context 
sensitive way, and regulated by stringent conventions and customs of the 
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language-speaking community. To lose the skeptic’s sense of certainty is to lose very little 
after all. 
 
7 A Batty Language 
We can imagine an exceptionally intelligent species of bat that has evolved its own 
language which, hypothetically, is as sophisticated as our own. The bats in this scenario 
sleep under the branches of what we roughly call “trees.” Imagine now that these bats, 
within their own language, refer to the trees as “nukkol.” The bat word for the tree 
identifies in our environment many of the same things, or kinds of things, that our word 
“tree” does, but it does ​not ​identify the exact same thing. The bat word “nukkol” may, for 
example, imbue the qualities (in approximately comparable human words) of ‘tall’ and 
‘safe’ and ‘shelter.’ While the human concept ‘tree’ is grammatically schematized such 
that ‘wood,’ ‘tall,’ and ‘hard’ are all tangentially related concepts. This is, of course, a 
dramatic oversimplification of both concepts but the idea is that as a human we may 
recognize things as trees that a bat would not and vice-versa. The point of this example is 
to illustrate from a different angle that our concepts, and what those concepts mean, are 
by no means referential.  
The referential theorist posits that meaning is denotative, that the word is a link 
onto a thing in the world — thus, “tree” simply means the wooden pillars we happen to 
call trees, and “nukkol” would likely be conflated to mean the same. Clearly, though, the 
meaning of each is far more complex — our words carry their weight only as they are 
seated within the vast and intricate web of our language and thus do not, as it were, 
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simply contain determinate, definitional meaning. This is analogous to the way that 
scribbles on a page do not carry intrinsic, absolute-meaning: They only carry the weight 
of meaning when understood, when someone with a particular background reads them and 
even then that meaning may range widely from person to person. To a young child they 
may literally be scribbles, while to another slightly more linguistically developed reader 
they may discernibly be words strung together but that are not yet recognizable, and to 
yet another who actually speaks the language the words may represent a scene in a play. 
Meaning, in this sense, is constructive just as, relatedly, object-hood is. 
Even though both bat and human can go into a forest and point to the same ‘object’ 
and say “nukkol” and “tree” respectively, a human may see a bonsai plant and call it a 
“tree” where the bat would not use the word “nukkol” at all because clearly the bonsai 
could not serve as a shelter for it. The constitution of our definitions of tree or nukkol are 
contingent on our (as well as our species as a whole) use of and experience with them, 
there is nothing about the thing that is tree’y or nukkol’y which makes us or the bats use 
those words for them. The bat, too, may look at a streetlamp and call it “nukkol” because 
it falls into the bat’s grammatical schematism for ‘nukkol’ as a tall, potential shelter. Were 
we to dissect the tree, peeling off bark and splitting wood to ​really ​see it, to find its 
essence, to find that which makes it a ‘tree,’ we would obviously be being foolish. The 
identity of the object does not reside outside of our construction of it linguistically and 
with the possession of these words, with the individuating lens provided by language, we 
tend to assume a more basic identity that. In understanding that our word ‘tree’ does not 
correspond to some essence of tree-ness, in understanding the picture of language I hope 
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to consolidate in this project, we may avoid many of the linguistic road-bumps, like 
skepticism, that trouble philosophers of a more referential mind.  
 
8 Tapestry 
Let’s imagine for a moment a two dimensional plane, extending in all directions, 
which to us appears to be a tapestry filled with washes of color. Given our unique 
neurophysiologies and sensory modalities we see a plane full of seemingly arbitrary, 
varied colors that gradate into one another such that there are no boundaries, no blocks of 
color, just an unbounded phantasmagoria of overlapping, interwoven color. Now let us 
consider an intelligent species that exists solely on this plane, living out their hypothetical 
lives on this tapestry. We can imagine then that the colors of the tapestry hold real-world 
significance to the creatures inhabiting it, that, for example, the gradient that emerges 
where red and green intersect constitutes a potentially fatal trap for the inhabitants while 
the more blue the area is the more sustenance the creatures can derive. That is, the 
creatures of the tapestry live and die, survive or perish, within and because of the 
environment that they occupy. Thus we can also imagine that over the course of centuries 
spent on the tapestry the creatures have evolved powerfully functional sensory modalities 
in response to their environment.  
The creatures have evolved the capacity to clearly individuate the contents of their 
world; they can literally ​taste ​the suppliers of sustenance or nutrition, they can ​see​ the 
places of peril in their world, they can ​feel ​the need for nourishment or a threat to their 
survival. The unique sensory modalities they have developed through the long term 
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dialogue of body and environment allow these creatures to distinguish individual things in 
their environment, they perceive (our equivalent of) food, they see distinct ‘traps’ and 
threats to their survival. Their world, that is, is stratified, full of individual entities that, 
as a matter of survival, the creatures have evolved to see and interact with. What to us 
appear to be nebulous washes seemingly random colors are, to the creatures, richly 
populated ecosystems and environments constituted by distinct entities that have direct 
bearing on the survivability of the creatures. But then, what is ​really​ there? Is the 
tapestry made up of a nebula of colors, unbounded and indiscrete, or is it constituted by a 
constellation of entities? Surely, we must answer, neither! The question is faulty, to us the 
tapestry is most certainly a wash of color and to the creatures the tapestry is 
unambiguously populated by a myriad of things — For us to ask what it is ​really​ is to 
seek definitional, determinate meaning, to look for the object in itself, instead of seeing 
that there is no objective ‘Truth’ to what the tapestry contains for its contents are the 
product, and construction, of the uniquely developed, language-using community that 
observes it. 
To clarify with a final experiment, let us imagine a canvas on a wall that, to you 
and I, is uniformly yellow. Now, consider a succession of species with extremely similar 
but slightly different sensory modalities from humans. A member from each species looks 
upon the canvas and sees something different. The first sees nearly what we see but 
darker, as shade of orange. The next sees a distinct red while each individual onward sees 
purple, blue, teal, green, and brown respectively. Is it sensible for us to ask, “What color 
is it really?” 
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9 Constraints of Language 
It is here worth noting that I am certainly not saying “the rock (color, snow) 
doesn’t exist ​as​ a rock objectively” only to have us then default to ‘atoms,’ or ‘strings,’ 
&c. Rather, in this we can feel the constraints of language. We should say that the atoms 
too are not somehow objectively singular entities, that at the level of vibrating quantum 
strings we would see no divine line around certain clumps of strings separating them from 
other clumps, but this would be defaulting to ‘strings’ as the somehow ontologically 
distinct ‘things’. We might say that the atoms are not objectively distinct, that viewed as 
a field of fluctuating energy it would be clear that there are no objective lines drawn 
around what we, through our training with language, see as discrete ‘atoms’ — but again 
we would then be privileging the ultimate existence of ‘energy’ which, too, is antithetical 
to the understanding of language here proposed. These are the constraints of language; 
we cannot convey the intuition of a thing not existing without somehow referencing other 
things and sinking into a futile recursivity. It is rather difficult to speak of the 
nonexistence of something outside of language while using talking about a nonexistent 
‘​something​.’ 
The only reality we have access to is the reality of our experience, the reality of 
perception shaped by language, and the objects of that reality only exist ​as ​objects (as 
singular entities) through our training with language. These hard, often jagged things are 
“rocks” despite the fact that there is nothing about this or that clump of molecules that is 
hermetically sealed, nothing about the rock that objectively individuates itself from the 
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trillions of molecules all around it. The rock — due to its characterization in language, its 
schematism in my personal lexicon — has identity and so to me, and those who share my 
language (who share similar language training), feels singular, contained, is an ​object​; but, 
were we somehow to view the rock and its surroundings at an atomic level, we would not 
so casually individuate; we would not presume identity. The rock has no objective identity, 
no essence that pulls it from its surroundings and makes it a singular entity; there is no 
divine line around what we call the rock separating it from the ground around it — we 
humans draw the line in language. Identity is a form of life as much as language, the 
diverse cultural history, personal connotations, environmental context, sensory modalities, 
&c. together give rise to the object and so too the ‘thing’ evolves, fluctuates, births new 
‘things,’ becomes antiquated, extinguished, and so on.  
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II. Perception and Technique 
 
1 Beginnings 
Beyond his discussion of how words are used, Wittgenstein also provides a detailed 
discussion of their functions, aims, and purposes. With these varied locutions 
Wittgenstein urges a more general sense of the part that expressions play in language, 
and thus that the mastery of a language consists in being able to employ its vast repertoire 
of expressions in the profoundly nuanced and varied language-games that they belong in. 
Given this constantly reaffirmed sense of contextual complexity it is unsurprising that the 
concept of use be so broad as to defy any singular theory could hoping to encompass it. 
But here, Wittgenstein offers, we want to object — “‘You take the easy way out! You talk 
about all sorts of language-games, but have nowhere said what the essence of a 
language-game, and hence of language, is: what is common to all these activities, and 
what makes them into language or parts of language’”.  Wittgenstein likens this pursuit, 10
this desire for generality or essential definition, to somebody trying to explain what a 
‘game’ is, trying to uncover or extricate the very essence of a game — the thing by which 
all games ​are​ games. 
 
Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, 
ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? — Don't say: "There must be 
something common, or they would not be called 'games' "-but look and see whether there is anything 
10 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations, §65. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953. Print. 
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common to all. — For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but 
similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.  11
 
In moving between particular instances of games and observing how multivalent 
and variegated they are (“Don’t think, but look!”) , he demonstrates that while there is 12
undoubtedly continuity among games, common characteristics, the most we could 
reasonably say ​of the entire lot ​is that they share a kind of ‘family resemblance.’ “We see a 
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall 
similarities ... I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 
"​family resemblances​"; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, 
features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc”.  The accumulation of particular 13
instances of language-use exemplifies Wittgenstein’s creed that “problems,” in philosophy, 
“are solved, not by coming up with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long 
been familiar with”  — rather than construct linguistic formulae in an attempt to uncover 14
some essential quality, we must consolidate and observe what is already in plain view in 
order to clear away confusion and misunderstanding. 
Before moving into our own examination of language — which will take shape as 
an inquiry into what kind of thing (or things) our training with language is, and how this 
training is embodied, manifest, present, &c. in our everyday life — let us first offer an 
account of Wittgenstein’s philosophy on rule-following, as well as a discussion of his 
notion of ‘understanding.’ In terms of the preceding chapter, the distinction between the 
11 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. ​Philosophical Investigations​, §66. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953. Print. 
12 ​Investigations​, §66. 
13 ​Investigations​, §66 - 67. 
14 ​Investigations​, §109 
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two paradigms of rule-following (the then-traditional calculus conception and the 
Wittgensteinian “mastery of a technique”) that we will discuss follows the same lines as 
the that between referential and so-called “ordinary” conceptions of language. Further, we 
will see that the convergence of Wittgenstein’s notions of rule-following and 
understanding provides fertile ground for an expansion of his thought into the territory of 
perception generally which, at length, ought to clear away the type of misunderstanding  15
endemic to epistemological and skeptical discourse. First, however, we must preface our 
descent into rules and their practice by highlighting the distinction between 
Wittgenstein’s earlier work, as seen in the ​Tractatus​, and his later views in ​Philosophical 
Investigations​. 
 
2 Denotative Links in Early Wittgenstein 
In his first work, the ​Tractatus Logico Philosophicus​, Wittgenstein’s position was 
that, seated within the kaleidoscope of ordinary language, there exists an essential, 
underlying logic that can be excavated through a structural analysis of the relationship 
between language and the world. Wittgenstein called this (the relationship between 
language and the world) a ‘picturing’ relation, and it took form, to summarize, as a 
denotative link between words and objects. Thus, in the ​Tractatus​, the meaning of a word 
was constituted with reference to the object it ‘pointed’ to; in this view names ​mean 
objects. In Wittgenstein’s transitional phase, as articulated in ​The Blue and Brown Books​, 
he inquires anew “What is the meaning of a word?” The reiteration of this question, 
15 Chapter 1, on ‘skepticism’  
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supposedly answered in his ​Tractatus​, signifies the beginning of the doubt felt toward his 
earlier work and thus a dramatic turning point in his understanding of language and 
philosophical methodology. Note that the following example quoting Augustine on 
language learning is not meant to equate the views of ​Tractatus​-Wittgenstein with 
Augustine but rather simply because it is a good example and, as Wittgenstein readily 
provides, is mistaken in many of the same ways that his own ‘picturing relation’ account 
of meaning is. At the beginning of the ​Investigations​ Wittgenstein calls upon Augustine to 
precisely articulate the position that he will be retaliating against: 
 
When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw 
this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. 
Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: 
the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone 
of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, 
as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to 
understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used 
them to express my own desires.  16
 
By showing ostensively that a word corresponds to an object, Augustine explains, 
he learns the word. While certainly there are instances of being taught the name of an 
object through ostension, as is often the case with second language learners, Wittgenstein 
(post-​Tractatus​) argues that this view, this ​theory​, is an ultimately insufficient account of 
both the method by which we learn language and the constitution of meaning. Just as the 
attempt to unify all games under single banner — i.e. “someone wins and someone loses” 
— falls flat (“what about ‘waiting games?’”),  so too is Augustine’s derivation of ostensive 
16 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. ​The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the 'Philosophical 
Investigations'​ Second ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1958. 1. Print.  
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learning an impermissibly sparse representation of language training generally. Under 
Augustine’s view, and in line with Wittgenstein’s ​Tractatus​ position, meaning is equated 
with the object; “cup” means cup because the word ​denotes​ the thing. 
The denotative picture of language posits that, whatever the mechanism for the 
acquisition of language, its contents correspond to pieces of the world and the function of 
our locutions is to communicate that correspondence such that, by adhering to the 
grammar, conventions, definitions, &c.  of the language we ​mean​ — proper conjugation 
and syntax in tandem with the appropriate concepts results in ‘meaning,’ in a ​sensible 
utterance in much the same way that the terms and syntax of a mathematical equation 
result in an ‘answer.’ The stringent rules of mathematics legislate that in the equation 
‘5+2 = x,’ x ​must ​be (‘mean’) 7 — the mathematical items, ‘5’, ‘+’, ‘2’, and ‘=’ combine 
to form a mathematical sentence which has a determinate meaning that can be derived 
univocally through the methodological adherence to the ‘grammar’ of mathematics. So too, 
under the Augustinian and early Wittgensteinian position, does the combination of words 
in this sentence, applied in accordance with the essential logic of language, have a 
determinate meaning. It is worth noting that, while there may be ​ad hoc​ exceptions, the 
denotative or referential picture of language generally holds ‘made up’ utterances as fully 
devoid of meaning. The homeless man yelling nonsense at me from across the street ​did 
not mean​ anything​ — ​he could not! His words had no referents and hence were vacuous 
— whereas I thought it meant “time to walk away,” and “this man is mentally unwell,” or 
maybe “you got a cigarette?” 
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3 Truth and Objectivity in Late Wittgenstein 
In stark contrast, Wittgenstein begins ​The Blue and Brown Books ​by carefully 
dismantling the question of meaning, the ​general​ question of meaning. By consolidating an 
understanding of the work language does in specific contexts, Wittgenstein demonstrates 
that, to ask generally about the meaning of a word, is to take ‘language on holiday.’ In 
specific contexts we are capable of plainly viewing the meaning of words, but when we 
attempt to analyze an expression and its ‘nature,’ in a vacuum, isolated from their natural 
context, we lose sight of the expression and the ways that the language did its work. “The 
confusions which occupy us,” Wittgenstein writes, “arise when language is like an engine 
idling, not when it is doing work”.  17
To return to Austin’s example in his essay ​Truth​, if we ask whether the statement 
“France is hexagonal” is true, we must realize that such an investigation must be 
contextually seated: For the purposes of a war general dispersing his troops and 
determining possible routes &c. the statement is true — for his purposes, yes, “France is 
hexagonal.” However, for the cartographer mapping the span from the Mediterranean Sea 
to the English Channel, “France is hexagonal” would likely be met with indignation. It is 
at best a rough approximation. However this too is only part of the story; in both cases 
there are a great many ways of understanding and conveying truth within such contexts 
as ‘a general commanding his troops’ or ‘a cartographer mapping the terrain of Western 
Europe’ and no one of them can be determinately derived from its originating expression 
17 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. ​Philosophical Investigations​, §132. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1-953. Print. 
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alone; much less can such a derivation be taken as a general principle of ‘Truth.’ Whether 
the statement is true, for the general or the cartographer, is almost besides the point — 
truth and falsity are just two concepts among a great many possibly more suitable 
concepts. To name a few: practical, approximate, rough, dangerous, efficient, &c. are in 
many ways far more valuable characterizations of the statement in its specific context.  
Now we want to say, “Well, perhaps we can permit truth (the word ‘truth’) to 
have different inflections in different contexts, but surely there when scientists debate the 
truth of a theory they are not squabbling over (“mere”) semantics, they are trying to 
determine which corresponds to the universe!” But is this any different? Undoubtedly the 
eidolon of science has reached a profound apotheosis in recent decades but should we 
consider the context of science to somehow transcend contextualization? The highly 
specialized language games of scientific enterprise are no less a context than that of 
soccer, or cooking, or a student in class. There is certainly something peculiar about the 
regulatory practices​ of the scientific community, the conventions to which they adhere, 
which ultimately engender a methodological and revisional rigorousness that we often 
default to as “the success of science.” But, we might ask, if stringent conventions alone 
are not enough to account for the truth, applicability, consistency, &c. of science, what is 
it that grounds the regulation? If there is no sense in ‘objective truth’ then what ​is​ the 
truth of science? With reference to what does science qualify its theories?  
In the previous chapter I made a show of why objects-in-themselves do not exist; 
here again we are given to wonder, if science is a map onto the so-called real, then is my 
denial of ultimately-existent things a dismissal of science — or, for example, of the atoms 
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on which Atomic Theory so heavily relies? Does the nonexistence of things-in-themselves 
stand to contradict String Theory because the theory posits the existence of ‘strings’? 
When I argue for the lack of sense in objective entities I am arguing against an often 
presupposed narrative that can have philosophically damaging implications. There is an 
important difference between the denial of a theory that makes use of the concept of 
bounded-entities and the denial of the position that those entities transcend the theory, the 
scientist, and the community, to exist unto themselves alone. I would not deny the success 
or applicability of mathematics because (excluding Category Theory) it utilizes a notion of 
discreteness, whether in points, sets, or numbers; however, the arguments of the previous 
chapter ​do ​stand against the notion of Mathematical Platonism which posits the existence 
of such entities outside of our field of mathematics, outside of human cognition, in the 
objective world.  
At the risk of redundancy let us reexamine the idea of things-in-themselves. The 
physical concept of discreteness is natural to us as we readily consider the world to be 
composed of pieces. A great deal could be said about why individuation is a part of our 
conscious experience, about how a world of objects is a place that can be described in 
causal terms, about how perceptory distinctions facilitate mental representation, allowing 
the cognitive power of planning and abstraction — but this would be idle speculation and 
is unrelated to the present argument. When I hold up a stick in each hand we can 
intuitively describe this as two sticks, two entities, but to say this discreteness inheres in 
the object-itself rather than the tremendously complicated web of language, person, 
culture, history, community, and so on, is a very different claim. A broken stick is now 
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two sticks — in the moment of breaking, as fibers snapped past one another, where was 
the moment they became two distinct things? I suppose it would be the moment when the 
last fiber was pulled asunder, thus separating the one into two. And if there was a piece of 
gum someone had placed on the stick, precisely at the place where the final fibers snapped, 
such that the stick was now held together only by the gum, would this be one or two 
objects (not including the gum)? Well, I’d think two because the gum is a different 
material. And what if it was not a piece of gum but rather a perfectly placed piece of wood 
inserted precisely such that the stick was never not in contact with more wood as it broke, 
is it now one stick or does should we say it must be from the original tree, or that it must 
have ​grown​ together, or…  
The problem of objects-in-themselves is peculiar given our many daily interactions 
with objects; we constantly navigate our lives under the assumption of objects — this is 
not wrong! Objects certainly ​do exist​ in an ordinary sense, it is only the peculiar, 
philosophical context of generalizable or objective things that the language “goes on 
holiday,” it is what Austin would call “a distortion.”  The regress of ad hoc answers 18
should be an indication of the queerness of such a line of questioning. Similar to “What is 
the meaning of a word?” the philosophical emphasis of the question “When does the stick 
(​really​) become two sticks (​objectively​)?” pulls the language out of context to a place 
where it can no longer do work. In real life, if (for whatever reason) I were actually asked 
when this stick became two sticks, I would say “when it broke in half,” and this would be 
a perfectly satisfactory answer just as “the definition” would be an adequate if vaguely 
18 See page 115 in ​Other Minds​ for a discussion of distortions in language.  
Austin, J. L. ​Philosophical Papers​, 115 Oxford: Clarendon, 1961. Print. 
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reductive response to the former question. The “engine idling” in Wittgenstein’s 
metaphor, reflects the attempt to pull the word or expression out from its specific context 
(where the language actually does its work) and evaluate it generally, thus creating the 
puzzle which confuses us into ultimately wondering not just about the truth of the 
particular statement but indeed “What Truth ​is​?” generally. 
There are no atoms-in-themselves or strings-in-themselves but this does nothing to 
devalue the practical effectiveness or even (in an​ ordinary ​sense) the truth of the theory. 
The atoms are a useful construct just as the numbers are to math — in math there are 
even theories which circumvent the need for discrete objects (Category Theory, for 
example) and so too in the twentieth century scientists shed the idea that atoms where the 
ultimate constituents of matter but rather were themselves a conglomerate. But let us not 
now make the mistake of thinking, “Oh, so then it’s just ​electrons ​objectively” — It is 
turtles all the way down. 
 
 
For there to be, as is the commonplace view in certain circles, an essential notion of 
truth — as opposed to a polysemous concept that is situated within the intricacies of 
particular language games and among whom there is merely a family resemblance — is 
for there to be an objective state of affairs in the world, the ‘Real’, that our expressions 
are true by virtue of; true ​with reference ​to. An objective, essential notion of truth 
mandates objective, essential correlates to the things that are true; for the statement 
‘there is an apple on my desk’ to be true in some objective sense, there must be some 
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fundamental, transcendent thing (that we call an apple) which is on top of some 
fundamental entity that we call “desk” — there must exist ​objects-in-themselves​. We have 
seen that the referential picture of language also posits a denotative link between words 
and the ‘things in the world’ to which they correspond. The propensity to seek generality, 
to grasp for an essential meaning, while understandable, defies the far more interesting 
and diverse reality of ordinary language and precludes the task of philosophy by muddling 
the ground with language on holiday. “Philosophy,” Wittgenstein writes, “is a struggle 
against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language.”  19
 
4 Rule Following 
In his ​Philosophical Investigations​ Wittgenstein was concerned with repudiating a 
particular view of rule following that treated rules and their applications as a kind of 
calculus. Among his many qualms with the theory, the traditional ‘calculus’ perspective 
held that, to follow a rule, there must be some kind of conscious or unconscious 
acquiescence to said rule. To move a pawn forward in chess, that is, is to act in 
accordance with and in reference to the rules constraining the pawns movement. The idea 
of a word, rule, image, &c. being ‘held before one’s mind’ when engaging in 
language-games is returned to repeatedly throughout the ​Investigations​ and here in the 
context of rule following this privacy is particularly problematic for Wittgenstein.  Not 
only, he argues, is this occult notion of rule following a relic of a of cartesian dualism but 
further the calculus conception views rules as ​legislative ​over our action. Wittgenstein 
19 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. ​Philosophical Investigations​, §109. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953. Print. 
 
 
Segal​ 46 
acknowledges that the rules may serve as a ‘guide’ insofar as our training with rules often 
(but not always) constitutes an initial template or methodology for their employment, but 
the idea that they are ​necessarily​ before one’s mind when acting in accordance with them 
is, for Wittgenstein, a doomed-to-fail attempt to ‘get at’ the essence of the activity of rule 
following. In seeing rules as legislative, the calculus-theorists facilitate the admittance of 
objective standards of correctness. While certainly there is a standard of correctness in 
our language use, we will see that it does not mysteriously transcend the language-using 
community. Wittgenstein argues that our training with rules is public and our application 
of rules within language games is manifest. By understanding rule following as an activity 
instead of a calculus we can begin to approach the topic of language training. 
Wittgenstein provides an account of meaning, rule-following, and understanding, 
that clears away many misunderstandings regarding the role of mental content in 
language use. By examining Wittgenstein’s depiction of understanding as “the mastery of 
a technique”  it is made clear that our words are not like keys that unlock mental content, 20
(or ‘meaning’, as construed by Augustine); our words are not understood after their 
utterance (after ‘examining the mental content contained within’) but ​with​ their utterance. 
"Just for once,” Wittgenstein pleads, “don't think of understanding as a 'mental process' 
at all! - For that is the way of talking which confuses you.” Our words are not strung 
together with constant mental reference to the rules of the language. Wittgenstein 
inquires broadly about our capacity to follow rules (grammatical and otherwise): "'How 
am I able to follow a rule?' - If this is not a question about causes, then it is about the 
20 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. ​Philosophical Investigations​, §199. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953. Print. 
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justification for my acting in this way in complying with the rule." How then are we 
capable of acting “this way” in accordance with the system’s rules and regulations, both 
formal and informal? Our words are uttered with the relevant background of our training, 
the intuition for language use hence developed, which provides the shape of our usage. 
Thus, in speaking ‘as a proficient English speaker’ the meaning of my words is not a 
mysterious second entity lying before one’s mind but is plainly manifest to us, in the 
words uttered (written) in the particular context of their utterance, with the relevant 
backgrounds of being proficient language users. Wittgenstein entices us, "But isn't chess 
defined by rules? And how are these rules present in the mind of someone who intends to 
play chess?".  The intuition that the rules of chess and the chess player’s actions are 21
divorceable; the intuition that an utterance can be divorced from the understanding of it is 
no more sensible than proclaiming that we see the sense-data of the cup in front of us 
before seeing ‘the cup’ itself. We cannot speak of the passive registration of sensory 
information and then of the qualitative experience inspired by it any more than we can 
sensibly talk about seeing the squiggles of ink before seeing the word. 
 
5 Understanding ‘Understanding’ 
The private picture of rule following arises out of the perception that rules 
uniformly underlie language thus provide objective standards of correctness — another 
reflection of the idea that though language coheres to the objective structure of the world. 
Wittgenstein argues instead that rule following arises out of the customs and conventions 
21 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. ​Philosophical Investigations​, §205. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953. Print. 
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of the language-speaking community and hence that the act of rule following is not 
internal but public, manifest in the use of language. The proficient chess player is not 
coerced into particular choices by the rules, rather they shape his understanding of the 
game and are manifest in how he navigates it. To “look” rather than “think,” as 
Wittgenstein earlier pled, let us imagine the progression, the training, of a soccer player. 
The nascent soccer player initially spends a great deal of time and effort simply 
‘getting a feel’ for the ball, for moving in tandem with the ball, for making it go where he 
wants it to, for not tripping over it. He fosters the development of the relevant muscles 
and begins to make the relevant neural paths and connections, the muscle memory. At 
some point he learns the rules of the game and, for a time, must make reference to them. 
That is, in the beginning he may sometimes remind himself of the rules in order to 
navigate the game successfully, he may reflexively want to pick up the ball but in 
considering this he recalls that only the goalie has this privilege. But other times, the 
player will forget the rules entirely, or the relevant ones; he may run the ball out of 
bounds or pass it to the wrong team.  
It is not an official rule that you cannot pass to the other team but there are a great 
many events and operations within the game that have consequences detrimental to your 
goals as a player — it is often just as damaging (to the objective of winning the game) to 
pass to the opposing team as it is to run out of bounds and provide the opposing team with 
the ball that way. But the effects of the player’s actions, of his running the ball out of 
bounds, of kicking and scoring a goal, of kicking and missing the goal, as well as the 
effects of his teammates actions, together constitute a multitude of micro-alterations and 
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inflections to the player’s understanding of the game, of his role within it, and how to 
navigate it. Now ultimately the player has etched the many rules, both formal and 
informal, into the pathways of his brain; he has acquired a reflexive understanding of 
soccer and so too, cultivated a kind of working intuition for ‘how to play soccer’ — He is 
like the ship’s captain who after decades on the sea, is able to navigate the ceaseless 
unpredictability of the ocean while keeping his crew safe and reaching a destination. 
Certainly there are times when both the player and the captain have to plan or deliberate, 
there are moments where abstraction is necessary and moments when explicitly consulting 
one’s memory of rules is vital (planning a complicated play without violating the ‘offsides’ 
rule, for example). But soon the soccer player has “mastered a technique,” rarely making 
explicit mental reference to his training anymore, he has been conditioned by it.  
Wittgenstein wrote that, “To understand a sentence means to understand a 
language” and “To understand a language means to have mastered a technique”  —  just 22
as the proficient listener understands the sentence without (typically) any interior mental 
reference, the soccer player has consolidated a wealth of experience, of training, that has 
engendered an understanding of the game and so too of “the sentence:” of the game at any 
given moment. As we have seen the training is not nearly so simple as reading the rule 
book until it is memorized. The soccer player must learn the relevant functions and 
variations of his body within the system of the game; he must acquire an intuition not just 
for 'staying within bounds' but also for how hard to kick, and when, and where on the 
ball, and from what distance, all based on the relevant context of the opponents around 
22 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations, §199. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953. Print. 
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him, the teammates nearby, where the goalie presently is, and finally entrenched in the 
idiosyncratic anatomy and competencies of the player himself, and so duly attached to his 
particular likes and dislikes, challenges and obstacles, personal agenda, ego, &c. This is 
not to say that the player is making constant reference to the aforementioned facets of his 
training (he usually does not contemplate how or why his last kick went awry before 
making his next) in order to act in the game; rather, in acquiring this intuition, the 
mastery of this technique, he ​understands​ the game around him  and hence navigates it 23
aptly in light of his training. And, in case this has not been made clear, one does not 
suddenly, after sufficient practice ‘get’ the mastery. Training, understanding, and 
technique, are not black and white — they are, of course, gradual processes and the 
understanding, the intuition for navigating the games, is ever-evolving.  
The player’s training, and that was by no means an exhaustive characterization of 
it, cannot be reduced to the rule book or a set of drills without massive blindness to 
relevant information; and thus the understanding too (of the game at any given time, and 
hence how to act in it), is accordingly irreducible. Our training with language is no 
different: growing up, listening, speaking, reading, learning, playing, arguing, and 
countless such events and activities and interactions are all constitutive of our training 
with language. When we speak, we do not ordinarily make explicit access to our training 
and, when we listen, we do not ordinarily understand by mentally referencing our 
training. Rather, we perceive and act in the light of my training (and thus, in perceiving, 
understand). 
23 To this effect, the player understands the game around him in the same way that you are capable of 
understanding the words that you are currently reading. 
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6 Regulation 
Like the game of soccer, language is a form of life which we cannot grasp in 
totality in each passing moment of its progression. No less so, the conventions for 
language-use, the criteria and grammatical schematism of concepts for the community at 
large, evolve through the totality of a society’s linguistic-engagements. They thus seem 
inaccessible to us because we are not capable of simultaneously interacting with everyone 
all-the-time, the grammatical schematism of our personal idiolects results from our 
engagement with only a relatively tiny portion of that totality. However, while the entire 
community is evolving so too are we. By being engaged members of a dynamic 
language-using community we receive constant feedback (we are understood and 
misunderstood, our language-use is validated and invalidated) that drives us toward 
attunement. Thus, over time, the schematism of our language approaches approximate 
correspondence to that of the community at large. This tendency founds the striking 
success of language but the idiosyncrasies of language use and training will inevitably 
become manifest as well: 
 
And obviously sometimes you’re going to be wrong in your assertion of the concept, and moreover you 
can never be sure you are not wrong. So say if you like that there are bases for applying concepts, and 
call those bases criteria; just don’t think it follows that you might not have to ​withhold​ the concept 
sometimes. And it might be wise to add, whenever you do assert it, a pinch of recognition (e.g., 
‘almost certain’) that you may have to take it back   24
24 Cavell, Stanley. ​The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy​, 68. New 
York: Oxford UP, 1999. Print. 
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The dictionary as well as the surface grammar of the language serve to explicate 
and solidify the otherwise nebulously evolving rules for language-use and hence we may 
find a common backing to many of our words and ways of speaking, but to truly ‘know’ a 
word it must be heard and used in such a variety of contexts so as to flesh out (for oneself) 
its schematization in language. Each individual’s criteria are manifest in the way that they 
speak (in asserting a concept you make public the satisfaction of your criteria for that 
concept’s use) and hence our interpersonal relationships and interactions engender the 
feeling of ‘near certainty’ in our language use but this leaves no room for skepticism about 
the so-called “reality” of the situation. 
The mastery of a language is publicly manifest, just as ‘whether someone knows 
how to play soccer’  will ordinarily be accessible to us through our perception of their 
soccer match (though it is likely we may not be able to make such judgments without 
ourselves possessing some semblance of the relevant techniques). Our training with 
language is seen and heard in our competent or incompetent application of concepts in 
language-games. Not only is our intuition for language use continually evolving but also, 
like the soccer player whose perception (understanding) of the game around him is 
gradually changed, the very way in which we perceive the world around us is altered 
through language: Try to see not words in this sentence but rather squiggles of ink on the 
page; try, in conversation, to hear not the words being said but the raw auditory sounds. 
As we navigate the world around us we see that world ​as ​ourselves; having internalized 
such sociocultural sign systems as language and mathematics our perception is forever 
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altered. 
 
 
7 Perception in the Light of Language 
Experience, whether in the form of language or soccer, astronomy or mathematics, 
trains us to understand, to ​perceive​ and to navigate the world around us in light of that 
training. We are not receptacles of raw sensory information which we then interpret. The 
astronomer, viewing the topological aberrations on the surface of the moon, does not 
encounter a kind of ‘raw picture of the moon’ that is ​then ​interpreted in light of his or her 
professional training; rather the astronomer literally perceives the moon ​in the light of his 
or her training​. We do not, Wittgenstein would argue, hear raw auditory input from a 
speaker and then somehow inject meaning into it with mental reference to prior 
experience; but rather, ​in hearing​, we understand — semantic content, “meaning,” is a 
fact of our use of language as proficient speakers. Just as you are not confronted with 
scribbles on a page but words, you do not perceive ​and then​ understand but, ​in perceiving, 
understand. You perceive in light of your training with language. And so it is that the 
world appears stratified for us — we are not presented with raw visual input but with 
objects.  
 The notion, that we hear, see, speak, understand, perceive, ​in the light​ of ​our 
training with language (and our professional endeavors, our hobbies, &c.), compels us to 
understand that our language use and our knowledge of and claims about our perceptions 
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of this profoundly affected world,  are not somehow justified by correspondence to the 25
so-called ‘nature of reality,’  but rather are substantive by virtue of their place within the 26
rich environmental, personal, and cultural history that contextualizes them. For a 
non-native speaker to be wrong in saying “this is a piece of painter” is for him to be in 
disharmony with the community at large, he is wrong not because ​actually  ​it is ‘paper’ 27
but because, conventionally, it is “paper,” because ​usually ​we call this “paper.”  
Our accumulated experience, our history, shapes how we perceive the world, it 
provides us with a lens through which objects take form, acquire identity, are 
individuated. A tremendous portion of our history in the world is also our training with 
language — every act of language we have ever encountered or performed, written or 
read, seen or heard, whether in the confines of our own heads or in outward verbal 
expression, together constitutes our training with language — and as such, language can 
be said to lend significant weight to the lens of experience. The objects of our perception 
and our abstraction are the fruit of human consciousness and not a glimpse into the 
stratified contents of an objective reality. As such, the ​ rightness and wrongness of our 
claims, our capacities and justifications for belief and knowledge, all exist within those 
same confines. For someone to be right or wrong, for a statement to be true, an individual 
to be honest, an accusation to be justified; these questions are answered with no appeal to 
25 The “affected world” here being the world inflected by our training with and use of language, the 
world as it is engendered by the culture, community, history, and physiology nothing less than full-blooded 
human beings; the world as ​we see it​. 
26 The idea that our claims about our perceptions of the world are justified by their correspondence to 
the state of the real, is one of the foundational ideas in a representational theory of meaning and is a tacit 
assumption of the skeptical problem of knowledge about other minds. 
27 “Actually” insofar as the word is used in philosophical contexts to indicate a correspondence to 
objective reality, e.g. “‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is ​actually ​white”  
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a transcendent state of affairs for they are games, they are activities and parts of 
activities, they are contextualized physically, personally, culturally, and historically and it 
would be nothing less than a distortion, a reduction, to seek more general answers to 
them.  
If a soccer player were to pass midfield while in possession of the ball,  grow 
nearer to the opposing goal but with the goalie facing her, while two opponents quickly 
close in from behind, and only one teammate parallel to her on the opposite side of the 
goal, the player then trying to curve the ball such that it might circumvent the goalie and 
score, only to miss — would it make sense for us to question whether this was objectively 
the right decision or the objectively wrong decision? Would it be sensible, if asked 
whether this was the right call, to appeal to an objective state of affairs? Or should we say 
that “the player was under a lot of pressure from midfield and only had a moment, she 
could have passed to her teammate for a better angle on the goal but that would likely 
have given the two opposing defenders the time needed to close the distance” — and this 
too would probably be a highly reductive analysis. I return to the example of soccer to 
illustrate the unrelenting complexity of actual human activity and accordingly, that the 
question of rightness and wrongness here, in ​this​ context, is answered through the 
resources of the game alone and thus necessitates the mastery of the technique. The 
context of the soccer player is no more or less intricate than that of the language speaker. 
 
8 Finding Truth 
To master a language, then, is not to master objective reality (it is not to have 
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somehow gained insight into how the world ‘really’ is) but to acquire a lens through which 
that world may be carved up. Through this predominantly shared lens we gain the 
capacity to communicate our experience, for, in carving up the world, we gain the facility 
to draw out and speak of its pieces. Our training with language, understanding the 
grammatical schematism of its concepts, constitutes that lens and that capacity. Thus, in 
claiming “there is a cup in front of me” we ought not ask whether ‘in actuality’ there is a 
cup for perhaps it is a tube (mug, hat, &c.), for this is neither the function nor privilege of 
language, rather we must ask if what we are seeing is conventionally (usually, ordinarily, 
&c.) a “cup,” or, if ‘wrong,’ perhaps it is (what the community would call) a “tube”, 
“mug”, &c. The normativity of our perceptions, the very fact that we can intelligibly 
question the veridicality of what we perceive, creates the false intuition that our 
perceptions and claims are ‘true’ or ‘false’ based on some notion of what is ‘objectively the 
case’ but there are no things, no individual entities, ‘objectively,’ for a claim to be held up 
against. If I am wrong in my claim that “there is a cup in front of me” it is not because 
‘objectively’ it is a tube, but because it is ​conventionally ​(typically, generally, &c.)​ a tube, 
it is usually called “a tube.” And so, had my training with language (specifically with 
‘cups’ and ‘tubes’) been more comprehensive​ I would have seen a tube ​and thus said “there 
is a tube in front of me.” We must not be tricked into asking “is this actually anger” out of 
a misbegotten intuition that the behavior, the criteria, merely indicate — though, of 
course, the further peculiarities of emotion and how we talk about it warrant additional 
analysis. 
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To understand what an apple is; what we call an apple; the ‘meaning’ of ‘apple,’ is 
to have the “ability to use the concept in conjunction with other concepts,” to have 
“knowledge of which concepts are relevant to the one in question and which are not;” and 
to know “how various relevant concepts, used in conjunction with the concepts of different 
kinds of objects, require different kinds of contexts for their competent employment.”  To 28
lack all of this, to lack the language training and hence the grammatical schematism for a 
concept, is to lack “not only a piece of information or knowledge, but the possibility of 
acquiring any information about such objects ​uberhaupt;​ you cannot be told the name of 
that object, because there is as yet no ​object.​”  To see emotion, to see joy, despondence, 29
ire, and so on, in the world around us is to have mastered a language, to possess its vast 
repertoire of concepts and their grammatical schematism, to possess their criteria and to 
hence perceive the world in light of them, to perceive the world ​constituted​ by them. Once 
this is the case, “Consciousness is as clear in his face and behavior, as in myself.”   30
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 Cavell, Stanley. ​The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy​, 73. New 
York: Oxford UP, 1999. Print. 
29 ​The Claim of Reason​, 77 
30 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. ​Zettel​, 221. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. Ed. G. H. Von Wright. Berkeley: U 
of California, 1967. Print. 
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                                         III. Emotion 
 
1 Introduction 
In his ​Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology ​, Wittgenstein sets out to 31
undermine and problematize much of the philosophical canon regarding the mind and how 
we talk about it. J.L. Austin’s landmark essay ​Other Minds ​ accomplishes many of the 32
same goals and, though they set about their work in characteristically different ways, 
Austin and Wittgenstein ultimately arrive in similar territory. In exploring each of their 
perspectives we will come to see that the way that we talk about the phenomenality — the 
quality or ‘feel’ — of our experience is deeply misbegotten; whether those locutions take 
form in the description of someone else’s mental state or in an account of our own 
experience, there are profoundly misleading assumptions manifest in the ways that we 
talk about feeling and emotion. The fallible characterization of phenomenology (the 
misleading depiction of conscious, quality-laden experience) evident in the way we speak 
31 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. ​Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology​. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. Ed. G. 
H. Von Wright and Heikki Nyman. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1980. Print. 
32 Austin, J. L. ​Philosophical Papers​. Oxford: Clarendon, 1961. Print. 
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of/describe emotions is symptomatic of a misunderstanding of how the verb ‘to know’ 
works — how and when we ‘know,’ what it is ‘to know.’  
The epistemological issues that seem to arise with the notion of private experience, 
and specifically those that arise in the context of the Cartesian mind , are the result of the 33
assumption that when we speak of the mind, whether ours or another’s, we are reporting 
on a kind of essentially private, interior life — that, to speak of or speculate about feelings 
and emotions is to try to ​get at ​something fundamentally disconnected from the exterior, 
physical world. Stanley Cavell’s ​The Claim of Reason ​ advocates the Wittgensteinian 34
position that, often, the outward behavior of a person quite simply ​is​ the criteria for the 
emotion, for ‘calling out’ their anger, for ‘knowing’ the man is expecting someone. In 
exploring the interwoven arguments of Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell I hope to 
ultimately show that, given the intersecting points of these authors, not only is the 
locution “I am expecting a friend” an ​expression ​of expectation but that behavior itself can 
be seen as an expression of phenomenality; or, rather, that one’s particular behavior 
(including the use of language) in a particular context, is manifest from, necessitated by, 
and an expression of their experiential state.  
There is a further issue that I believe is worth bringing notice to now and as it is 
one that will recur throughout the writing to come: Language, being inescapably the 
medium through which I here will be formulating an argument, poses constraints on my 
writing that are of the very type I wish to highlight and renounce. For example, when I 
33 The philosophical tradition engendered by Descartes known as Cartesian dualism posits that mental 
phenomena are divorced from the physical world—that the mind, consciousness is a nonphysical substance. 
34 Cavell, Stanley. ​The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy​. New York: 
Oxford UP, 1999. Print. 
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speak of an individual’s experiential “state” I am being unintentionally misleading. One of 
the fundamental, seemingly omnipresent assumptions exemplified in (or, at the very least, 
reinforced by) our language use that has also toxically extended into philosophical 
discourse, is the objective existence of, singular entities — the existence, that is, of 
objectively singular​ objects — which, in totality, constitute an objective reality. While this 
notion is complicated to articulate, it is actually a rather simple idea that happens to be 
constrained by the opaque language used to describe it. Do not mistake me for saying that 
‘states,’ ‘cups,’ emotions,’ &c. do not exist for surely we are not wrong to speak of them, 
rather the point is that the constant linguistic realization of such concepts consolidates an 
intuition that, objectively, outside of human experience, there exist individuated ‘things’ 
that our words refer to — that though the name ‘cup’ is simply a tag we have created, 
underneath the word is some actual, existent object. Later in this paper I will be exploring 
in far greater detail what this assumption means for philosophy and why, despite how 
tremendously intuitive it is, we ought not subscribe to it. For now though, be aware that 
the constraints posed by language resolve me to speak of mental “states,” of “atoms,” of 
distinct “criteria,” and so forth but this is not to say that such ‘things’ exist as individual 
entities objectively — the importance of this point will become far clearer as the paper 
progresses. 
The notion that my behavior, both internal and external, verbal and nonverbal, to 
be an expression/manifestation of my experience carries the invaluable implication that 
emotion (the quality of conscious experience) is, so to speak, worn on our sleeves. To some 
this may seem obvious or intuitive but it carries with it far-reaching epistemological and 
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ontological implications that I will here attempt to explicate. However, it is first important 
to note that this claim is neither saying that all emotion can be reduced to behavior, nor 
that we ought not concern ourselves with one’s inner, conscious life in making a judgment. 
The argument I will be presenting in retaliation against the skeptical tradition is fully 
distinct from behaviorism and conventionalism. Rather, in this paper I will attempt to 
show that behavior is one illuminating facet in a larger totality that, in many 
circumstances, can facilitate the ready and accurate assessment of emotion — in ordinary 
light and familiar circumstances we readily perceive the consciousness of others, we ​see 
their happiness, anger, &c. This is by no means to be taken as the claim that one can 
introspect​ another individual’s experience (that one can feel what someone else is feeling), 
but merely that, in the same way that we presently see this paper before us, we can and 
often do see (recognize) emotion. 
 
2 Wittgenstein on Ascriptions of Mental States 
Toward the end of his ​Philosophical Investigations ​ Wittgenstein fervently denies 35
that first-person ascriptions of mental states such as “I’m expecting him to arrive in five 
minutes”  or “I wish it would stop raining” are reports or descriptions of some necessarily 
interior (and hence private) mental state. Rather these statements, in Wittgenstein’s eyes, 
are actually manifestations of the mental states, or ​expressions​ of them. When I am 
expecting a friend to arrive, when I am experiencing the state of ‘expectation,’ that state 
may be expressed in my saying ‘I’m expecting her to arrive soon’ or ‘where is she?’ Just 
35 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. ​Philosophical Investigations​. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953. Print. 
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as I might rub my temples when having a particularly troubling headache, I also might 
say ‘I’m in pain’ and the locution is no less an expression of my psychological state than 
my rubbing my temples. As Wittgenstein explains, “By nature and particular training… 
we are disposed to give spontaneous expression to wishes in certain circumstances.”  36
The boy who, after being stung by a bee, says ‘that hurts!’ is expressing his pain as 
much as he is by shaking the arm that got stung by the bee, “The statement ‘I am 
expecting a band at any moment’ is an expression of expectation” (Wittgenstein, P.253)  37
— Wittgenstein is making the point that such ascriptions are not to be seen as the 
external signs of some internal phenomenon but rather should be viewed as themselves a 
part of the experienced state, a part of ‘being in pain.’ In some cases, part of what it is to 
be in pain is to say “Ouch that hurts!” Just as in some cases part of what it means to wish 
for something is to say ‘I wish...’ 
Wittgenstein goes on to explain that in the case of third-person ascriptions, like 
‘she’s bored’ or ‘he might be in pain,’ we are, much like in the case of first-person 
ascriptions, merely expressing our behavior towards others. That is, in many 
circumstances, part of what it means for me to believe someone is bored is to say “she’s 
bored.” Similarly, we can imagine a circumstance where someone is being punished and I, 
being an onlooker, am concerned for their well being; in this circumstance my saying 
“Sarah, he’s in pain!” is an expression of my belief that Sarah’s victim is in pain and, too, 
that I am concerned and want her to stop hurting him. Wittgenstein writes that “being 
sure that someone is in pain, doubting whether he is, and so on, are so many natural 
36 ​Philosophical Investigations​, §441 
37 ​Philosophical Investigations​, §253 
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instinctive kinds of behavior towards other human beings, and our language is merely an 
auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation. Our language-game is an extension of 
the primitive behavior.”  In this passage, the “primitive behavior” to which Wittgenstein 38
refers can be understood as the more reflexive or basic behavior that often accompanies a 
feeling or emotion; thus wincing or grimacing when in pain or pacing anxiously when 
anticipating something constitute kinds of primitive behavior. So, when Wittgenstein 
notes that our language is “merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of” our 
instinctive behaviors towards other people we can see the implication that Wittgenstein, 
like Austin, recognizes that the states deemed essentially ‘inner’ and ‘private’ in the 
traditional formulation of the ‘problem of other minds’ are in fact tied up, in most ordinary 
contexts, with an entire array of manifestly public behaviors; and, though those behaviors 
(both primitive and linguistic) in some cases necessitate a level of language proficiency to 
be understood — to be ​seen ​— the way we behave and talk is deeply intertwined with the 
quality and emotion of our experience. The way we behave is manifest from and an 
expression of the phenomenality of our experience. As such, in the right context (in broad 
daylight, viewed by someone who knows you well, for example), it should be plainly 
evident how you are feeling; whether you are angry or sad, content or restless.  We need 
not ambiguate the situation of someone commenting on, for example, an angry person by 
asking “But is she really angry, or are these just symptoms of anger?” For, in ordinary 
circumstances, that should be clear as day and, if it is not, that is not because their 
outward behavior is a mere an indication of a fundamentally inaccessible interior but 
38 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. ​Zettel​, 545. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. Ed. G. H. Von Wright. Berkeley: U 
of California, 1967. Print. 
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because perhaps in the present context the criteria do not plainly show anger, perhaps 
they show something more complex — a shade of anger, a combination of rage and 
self-pity, &c.  
 
3 Austin on Signs and Symptoms 
As Austin writes in his ​Philosophical Papers,​ we may talk of signs of a storm that 
has or will occur but not of one that is presently occurring. The air might be thick and so 
‘smell like a storm is coming’, or the morning after one there might be a lightning strike in 
a tree, and all of these things might be considered signs of a storm, but we ought not talk 
about the literal presence of a storm, of black clouds and pouring rain and thunder, as 
‘signs of a storm,’ they simply ​are ​the storm. Analogously, it is possible that one might 
enter a house and find it in disarray (papers everywhere, a broken chair, &c.) and rightly 
say that these things are signs of anger, of someone who was angry. But in the presence 
of anger we ought never talk of its many manifestations and characteristics as signs or 
symptoms of anger for they quite simply ​are​ the anger, are part of the anger, are 
expressions ​of anger. “What is important,” Austin writes, “is that we never talk of 
‘symptoms’ or ‘signs’ except ​by way of implied contrast with inspection of the item itself.” 
 Both Austin and Wittgenstein thus retaliate against the traditional skepticism 39
regarding other minds, the seemingly intuitive language we use in talking about emotion 
deludes us into seeing our words as indicating mental states instead of describing them, 
being a part of them.  
39 Austin, J. L. ​Philosophical Papers​, 105 Oxford: Clarendon, 1961. Print. 
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4 Cavell on Criteria and Deep Grammar 
The notion of criteria here plays a very important role for they justify us in 
our claims about emotion and, more particularly, can be seen as the cause or stimulus for 
those claims. To have the criteria for a concept is to ‘understand’ it, to see and know it in 
the world, to be capable of seeing and knowing it. For Cavell, criteria justify the observer 
in the knowledge claim (in saying) “that is X.” And what could ‘knowing’ be, besides 
being justified in claiming to know? In seeing that criteria justify the knowledge claim we 
must also see that this (having the criteria) ​is​ what it is ‘to know X’. And, as such, to 
have the criteria for a concept (for that concept to be grammatically schematized in one’s 
personal lexicon) is to understand it — to, literally, see, identify, and ​know ​it in the world 
around us. In possessing the criteria for the concept of ‘expecting a friend’ one can 
recognize, literally, ​see​ the man (pacing anxiously, checking his diary, looking out the 
window, and setting out tea) ​as ‘a man expecting a friend’. 
 
The criteria do not relate a name to an object, but, we might say, various concepts to the concept of 
that object. Here the test of your possession of a concept (of the meaning of a word; of what it is to 
know something) would be your ability to use the concept in conjunction with other concepts, your 
knowledge of which concepts are relevant to the one in question and which are not; your knowledge of 
how various relevant concepts, used in conjunction with the concepts of different kinds of objects, 
require different kinds of contexts for their competent employment  40
40 Cavell, Stanley. ​The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy​, 73. New 
York: Oxford UP, 1999. Print. 
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In possessing the grammatical schematism, explained above, for ‘cup’ (in knowing 
what a cup is), I do not see the white, round shape in front of me that is filled with clear 
liquid and then through some ambiguous mental gymnastics arrive at the conclusion that 
there is a cup in front of me, ​I simply see the cup​, I ‘know’ there is a ‘cup’ in front of me. 
In fact, when looked at more closely, we can see that the notion (of perceiving the 
characteristics of the cup and only then deducing that it is indeed a cup) is poorly 
disguised nonsense. If, in ordinary circumstances, I did actually perceive the 
characteristics of the cup in order to conclude its being a ‘cup’, then how did I ascertain 
the precise identity of those informing characteristics? How did I know it was ‘white’ and 
‘round’? By observing the underlying characteristics of whiteness and roundness and 
hence deducing that it was white and round? Then what of those characteristics? The 
regression here outlines the fallibility of the inciting idea. We do not, in clear light and 
ordinary circumstance, privately ascertain the identity of our perceptions, rather, we 
simply see the cup as a cup. Having been trained into proficiency in a language we have 
acquired a vast and intricate web of concepts and an intuition, a mastered technique, for 
their profoundly nuanced and varied contextual employment.  
In learning a language we learn a way of seeing the world, we learn to see ​our 
world​. ​When I see the boy in class with eyes drifting around the room, with his head 
perched carelessly on his hands, having no overt reaction to the professor’s lecture, I 
simply see that he is bored, I possess the concept of boredom and recognize its criteria 
here and can hence quite simply tell that he is bored. As Wittgenstein writes, “Look into 
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someone else's face, and see the consciousness in it, and a particular shade of 
consciousness. You see on it, in it, joy, indifference, interest, excitement, torpor, and so 
on… Do you look into yourself in order to recognize the fury in his face? It is there as 
clearly as in your own breast.”  41
 
5 Reconciling Language and Emotion 
Having established the idea that language provides (a portion of) the lens through 
which we view the world, that as proficient language users we literally perceive the ‘cup,’ 
the ‘storm,’ the man’s ‘anger,’ and that our perception of these things need not be tethered 
to some notion of objectivity but rather can be understood as a testament to our active, 
ongoing engagement in the language-speaking community. While there are cases of 
ambiguity, in ordinary circumstances the storm does not come to us piecemeal: high 
winds, heavy rain, thunder in the distance, and (wait for it) lightning! are not consolidated 
in some kind of conceptual, cognitive-arithmetic that outputs ‘storm.’ No less, 
Wittgenstein’s man pacing back and forth, looking out the window, checking his datebook, 
&c. can simply be seen as ‘a man expecting a friend.’ There will always be cases of 
exception, cases where we are reticent, where our judgment is held back, but these are not 
indicative of some general principle that states we, in all cases, ​can not​ see his anger, 
expectation, boredom, and so on. Rather our participation in the meaning-making practice 
of language engenders a rich and colorful lens through which we ​do​ see the storm, the 
‘anger,’ the ‘man expecting a friend.’ But we must be careful here for we are in danger of 
41 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. ​Zettel​, 220. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. Ed. G. H. Von Wright. Berkeley: U 
of California, 1967. Print. 
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making the same mistake that the skeptic makes: In precisely the same way that we ought 
not extricate a general principle of The Unknowability of Emotion, so too we must 
restrain ourselves from taking the ordinary visibility of emotion to entail the Necessarily 
Ever-Present Visibility of Emotion. There are a great many cases where, in fact, we 
simply do not know an individual’s precise emotional state and, further, there are cases 
where we even may never know!  
Toward the end of Austin’s essay ​Other Minds​ he speculates that Mr. Wisdom 
(advocating skepticism of other minds) is “justified” in feeling that “there is a further and 
quite ​special​ difficulty”  in the case of knowledge about mental states and clarifies this 42
saying “Might the man not exhibit all the symptoms (and display and everything else) of 
anger, even ad infinitum, and yet still ​not ​(really) ​be ​angry?”  On the surface this 43
question seems intuitive, surely we often exhibit the behavior of one thing while feeling 
another altogether, surely we can ​act​. Let us consider that perhaps the issue is not so 
much ​is she sad and only pretending to be happy?​ but instead​ isn’t my thought “​is she sad 
and only pretending to be happy?​” itself a complicated and expression of my perception of 
her emotional state. First let us turn to Wittgenstein when he writes that we see not just 
emotion in the face of another but a “particular shade” of emotion. Here he highlights an 
important reality: Emotion is no simple, easily reducible thing; there is a color, shade, 
nuance, and subtlety to our conscious experience. It is a rare thing for someone to 
conform, without remainder or reduction, to our articulations of emotional states.  The 
lack of tone and nuance at play in such scenarios as being described as ‘happy,’ ‘sad,’ 
42 Austin, J. L. ​Philosophical Papers​, 111. Oxford: Clarendon, 1961. Print. 
43 Philosophical Papers​, 111 
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‘angry’ or otherwise fails profoundly to encapsulate the depth and context of our feelings-- 
Even our more subtle, particularized adjectives (quizzical, disgruntled, serene) rarely do 
justice to the totality and specificity of the experienced emotion. Truly we do have a 
powerful intuition that we can be something and yet behave as something else but I take 
this delusion to arise from a too casually simplified construal of what it is to ​‘be something​’ 
at all. 
If I am angry and angry is all I am (assuming we can even sensibly talk of such a 
thing) then I would necessarily behave angrily, my behavior would express my anger and 
be a part of it, of being angry. But surely, Austin posits, could you not possess that precise 
feeling and yet, for whatever reason, behave differently? Well, if I were upset, and for 
whatever reason wanted to express myself differently -- for example because I don’t want 
my friends to worry -- then I am not simply upset. Rather, I am upset and also nervous or 
ashamed or concerned &c. at the prospect of my friends worrying and, as such, my 
behavior is a precisely suited expression of that state. Sometimes a part of being angry 
and ashamed is trying to behave in such a way as to disguise that anger. Perhaps I can 
successfully mislead my friends into seeing me as not upset but that is not because my 
outward state differs in kind from my inward one, rather it is precisely because of the way 
that I feel, in totality, that my behavior takes that form.  
My behavior (attempting to act calm and unphased) is an expression of my mental 
state (angry and ashamed) but only those possessing the relevant contextual details, 
familiarity with my idiosyncrasies, knowledge of my natural history, would be able to see 
it as such. The recognition of the criteria here for my mental state depends on not just the 
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possession of the grammatical schematism for the relevant general concepts but also on 
the possession of an intimate personal, contextual knowledge which furnishes those 
concepts with meaning and specificity in this particular context, in this particular 
interaction with this particular person. thus, while it might mislead my acquaintances, 
upon returning home to my spouse and exhibiting the same behavior, she, given her more 
intimate knowledge of my idiosyncrasies, history, and recent context, might very well see 
me as ‘upset, ashamed, and doing my utmost to hide it.’ Thus in the specific context of my 
standing front of someone who possesses the relevant knowledge, my behavior ​is​ the 
criteria for my mental state, for seeing me as ‘upset and ashamed.’ Whereas, in the case of 
a stranger, I am seen as perfectly alright but not because, as the skeptic advocates, my 
external being is a fallible symptom of my internal being; rather it is because my ongoing 
behavior is part of a larger totality of which the stranger, unlike the confidant, is not 
aware. To speak of ‘being angry’ and ​only​ ‘angry’ may very well be nonsense as the 
quality of our experience does not fall neatly into categories that can classify our present 
states without ambiguity or blindness to some facet of our present experience.  If we could 
simply be angry then it would manifest truly. Still this is counter-intuitive, we protest 
‘Well I really am happy right now and yet can wear a guise of apathy or sadness, you 
would never know!’ And indeed it is the case that ​I ​may ‘never know,’ but the crux of the 
matter is not so much whether a false-portrayal of your present state is successful or 
unsuccessful but that in fact there is no such thing as a false-portrayal at all, just a bad 
judgment on my part or on over-simplification on theirs. 
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Take, for example, Elizabeth. Each day when I arrive home from work I chat with 
my housemate Elizabeth, who is at school during the day. On one particular afternoon I 
arrive home expecting to find her upset, because earlier that day a mutual friend 
mentioned that every single student in one of Elizabeth’s classes had failed their midterm 
exam. I expected Elizabeth to be upset because I know that she, like myself, takes her 
academic work very seriously. Strangely though, when I walked into our kitchen and said 
hello she did not seem upset at all. Rather, she appeared to be contentedly cooking, 
seemingly unperturbed by the day’s events. I wondered to myself, ​is she really happy or 
just pretending to be happy? ​Here we have a case in which, surely, I do not know how she 
feels. What does this tell us about our ascriptions of mental states? Well, when viewing 
this situation as a lack of judgment, a kind of back-and-forth between two emotions 
(happy and upset), it does indeed seem that I am simply at a loss. However, if we take a 
step back from the utterance and, instead of viewing it as my inability to reach a judgment 
about her emotional state, see the entire expression — “is she really happy, or just 
pretending to be happy?” — taken in totality, as a judgment, as an ascription of a mental 
state, then our view would be cleared.  
Let us imagine that, as it turns out, there has always been an unspoken 
competitiveness to my relationship with Elizabeth who, as such, was embarrassed about 
her failing mark and withheld any explicit show of her own irritation so that I would not 
think less of her. The problem here is that we are very attached to our emotional ​labels​ — 
the fact that we cannot easily apply ‘happy’ or ‘sad’ makes us uneasy, as though my 
oscillating between the two were as unsubstantive as my not making any judgment at all. 
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But ​this​ is the point! My entire expression, the very fact that I was indeed experiencing 
such an internal dialogue about whether it could be this or that, was itself an honest 
expression of my understanding of her emotional state. It is as though, to place us in 
familiar ground, we could have a third emotion word ‘​really-happy-or-just-pretending’ 
that I can see her as, just as I can see the ‘angry’ man or the expectant one, and so on. 
The perception of emotion is a complicated dialogue between the observer and the 
observed. The relevant contextual details (the failed test), my historical or personal 
knowledge of the individual (the unspoken competition, academic seriousness, &c.), as 
well as the current context (Elizabeth’s calm demeanor while cooking) all culminate in my 
perception of Elizabeth in this situation — it is the full-blooded complexity of human life, 
of felt experience ​and nothing less​ that engenders such rich and densely populated visions 
as our own.  
 
Your present feelings, your beliefs, expectations, desires and goals, are all 
exemplified simultaneously, occurently, in ​how you​ are right now​, and ‘what you are 
doing’ is as much a part of how you are as ‘what you are feeling’. If I feel happy and 
pretend to be sad then I have my reasons for doing so--the reality is not that there is a 
dichotomy of ‘​really​’ being happy that runs parallel to ‘coming off’ as sad, but instead that 
what I ‘really’ am is not reducible to a single emotion, like ‘happy’, but rather is a vastly 
intricate network of feelings, beliefs, ambitions, intentions, motivations, past experiences 
&c. So it is that when I pretend to be sad I am not so much ‘actually happy’ as I am 
‘actually happy and somehow motivated to appear sad,’ and hence the behavior that is 
 
Segal​ 73 
being called pretending is in fact a necessarily appropriate manifestation of how I truly 
am. We misleadingly label it ‘pretending’ simply because we often lack the relevant 
information or context to label it what it actually is.  
Indeed, we have all experienced being angry and yet simultaneously reluctant for 
whatever reason (insecurity, shame, fear) to admit or expose that anger; thus our external 
manifestation may be delusive (someone could easily misinterpret your ​seeming ​lack of 
anger as an ​actual ​lack of anger) but really it is perfectly suitable. To ​be 
angry-and-hesitant-to-admit-that-anger is to ​behave ​angry-and-hesitant-to- 
admit-that-anger. In a case like this where one’s emotional state is complex the observer 
may very well be too unfamiliar with your behavior or the wider context of your history 
and as a result misinfer what your behavior ​is,​ but the relevance of how well you judge 
harkens back to Austin’s qualification of knowledge. It should not be surprising, really it 
should be obvious, that our judgments about someone’s behavior are often wrong, just as 
our judgments about the world and everything else often are. While this difficulty is 
frustrating it is not so insurmountable that we can take refuge in the notion that, even in 
theory, we ​could not​ know​, as if due to some enigmatic cloaking mechanism. Rather than 
plead impossibility we should consider that, in situations where we fail to accurately 
assess behavior, it is not the privy access to the person’s phenomenal state that is our 
undoing but instead our lack of information, familiarity, intimacy, historical knowledge 
&c. with the person that disallows us from recognizing the criteria being presented to us .  
The fact that we do not necessarily have an accurate understanding of the behavior 
we seek to understand should ​not​ lead to a bifurcation of mind from body but rather to a 
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careful consideration of the wider context. All apparent aberrations of behavior stem from 
a lack of necessary or relevant information. In knowing someone intimately for many 
years, in sharing experience and life with them, the behavior, which to someone less 
educated in their particular manner of being would seem ‘sad,’ would to you be aptly 
recognized as ‘happy-but-trying-to-appear-sad’ for reasons x, y, z. Surely I am not alone 
in having been upset while trying to maintain a ‘happy-face’ when low-and-behold 
someone very close to me asked what was wrong, where no one else possessed the 
relevant context and familiarity that would have allowed them to recognize that there was 
something wrong at all. Like language, behavior is nuanced and entrenched in context, to 
assume that an action can be isolated from its situation and still evaluated as though it 
corresponds so simply to a single thing is to dramatically oversimplify the fact that 
everything we do is a part of everything we are. Recognizing the fallibility of judgment 
must not lead to the conclusion that what we see overtly is a potentially delusive version 
of what we are under the surface; instead we should endorse the idea that the fallibility of 
our judgments arises out of our lack of relevant knowledge and our blindness to greater 
context. The more you know the more accurately you can see someone’s actions for what 
they are.  
In the end then, the ‘something special’ in the case of recognizing another’s feelings 
that Austin hints at toward the end of ​Other Minds​ mustn't be referring to a mysterious 
dualism of mind and body but rather to the less mysterious, and far less troubling, 
understanding that you simply can’t know everything and so at best all judgments are 
approximate.  To those who have all of the relevant knowledge (though few they will 
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likely be) it will be necessarily evident what the manifest behavior really is because that 
behavior is an infinitely nuanced exemplification of how you really are. A final 
clarification: To behave a facsimile of usual-anger does not mean that you are actually, or 
even nearly angry but that the act of, and motives for, attempting to give a false 
impression of yourself would have some external criteria and so (given proper contextual 
knowledge) could be reasonably distinguished from actual anger. To actually behave 
happy is to be actually happy.  
 
6 Idiosyncrasy and Commonality 
And, though our outward behavior in all of its massive nuance and complexity is 
manifest from and an expression of the equally subtle and intricate phenomenology behind 
it, there is another important facet of Austin’s question we must elucidate such that we 
might further understand the confusion surrounding other minds. Due to the inherent 
contrast in the way each of us experience the world, as unique human beings possessed of 
unique neurophysiological capacities, idiosyncratic histories and so on, we thus express 
ourselves, our psychological states, in unique and varied ways. The contrast in the 
experience of one human to another, biological and historical, is manifest in the contrast in 
their behavior. The teenager whose therapist has indicated a ‘problem with anger’ and 
provided coping strategies for it naturally expresses her anger in a unique way, in a way 
inflected by her experience with her therapist and, generally, in a way inflected by her 
entire natural history. This, the disparity in our modes of experience and means of 
expression, is vitally important to understanding why Austin’s question is misleading. 
 
Segal​ 76 
When Austin describes the man as exhibiting “all the symptoms (and display and 
everything else) of anger” we must understand Austin to be generalizing; that is, the man 
exhibits all of the conventional, ordinary, usual, standard &c. behavior of anger and yet 
‘really’ feels something besides anger. The variety of manifestations that our phenomenal 
states may take is in a sense equilibrated here such that, going about the world, one can 
assess the ‘typical’ behavior of the ‘typical’ person, but this leveling off, this abstraction 
from the particular is deeply misleading as it allows us to seemingly sensibly pose Austin’s 
question.  When we instead zoom in and examine a particular case of an actual person’s 
behavior we can see that, though their behavior might not be the conventional/usual 
manifestation of whatever emotion, it ​is their​ expression of that emotion.  
 
7  Inferential Distance or Ordinary Ambiguity? 
The seeming inferential distance in our judgments of other minds, or, rather, in the 
way we perceive emotion in the world around us, is far less mysterious than the 
philosophical tradition has made it out to be. The same kind of misunderstanding that is 
constantly at play in our lives as we interact with the world is what we too hastily deem a 
mysterious inferential distance in how we see, and misunderstand, the emotions of others. 
Take Jones, as he walks down the road at dusk he surveys the horizon and sees a person 
standing, immobile in the lawn a block down. As Jones approaches the person he becomes 
better illuminated, and can be seen more clearly, at this point Jones realizes that the 
‘person’ he was seeing is actually an oddly shaped mailbox. The process of Jones 
approaching the person, of Jones becoming suspicious of the figure’s extended stillness, of 
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the increasingly clear mailbox-esque shape of the person, all resulting in Jones’ ultimately 
seeing that, no, it is a mailbox, is entirely analogous to the process of approaching a 
person and seeing that they are happy, realizing gradually that their smile falters, hearing 
about some unfortunate news regarding them, and ultimately seeing that, no, this person 
is upset and trying to retain a ‘happy face.’  
 
 
 
8 Conclusion 
Behavior is honest. Our phenomenal experience is manifest, however subtly or 
imperceptibly, in our behavior. We can misunderstand behavior, we do sometimes 
misunderstand emotion. This is the result of the complexity of felt-experience and the 
nuance and richness of relevant contextual, historical and personal information which we 
may or may not be in possession of. To say that lacking these things and thus calling 
someone angry when really they were “pretending to be irritated” is a result of the 
fundamental inaccessibility of other minds is no more sensible than if I were to claim that 
my having never played croquet and hence not being able to understand  the state of the 44
game entails an unbreachable barrier between myself and croquet. 
A final passage from Austin in answer to the residual dissatisfaction that such a 
discussion is ultimately besides the point because, “The real crux of the matter remains 
44 In the Wittgensteinian sense, understanding as “the mastery of a technique.” 
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still that ‘I ought not to say that I know Tom is angry, because I don’t introspect his 
feelings’” 
 
1. Of course ​I​ don’t ​introspect Tom’s feelings...  
2. Of course ​I ​do​ sometimes know Tom is angry. 
3. To suppose that the question ‘How do I know that Tom’s angry?’ is meant to mean ‘How do I 
introspect Tom’s feelings?’, … is simply barking our way up the wrong gum tree   45
 
 
  The Cartesian narrative of mind independent from a body, of inside and outside, 
has long been damaging to both ordinary intuitions and philosophical discussions — our 
behavior whether public (what others see of us) or private (one’s inner monologue) fully 
exemplifies, ​is literally suited to, necessitated by, and an expression of​, the phenomenality 
of our experience. And, though it is not unusual for an observer to lack some relevant 
information or familiarity which would enable him to recognize the outward behavior, the 
criteria, of the person being observed as the emotion that it is, there are indeed external 
criteria that, given relevant historical and contextual knowledge as well as language 
proficiency, enable the observer to recognize what they are feeling, to “see the 
consciousness in [someone else’s face].”  The idiosyncratic sensory modalities and 46
neurophysiological capacities each of us possess certainly engender challenging variety in 
outward criteria and the inability of such simple, one-dimensional words for emotion 
(‘happy,’ ‘sad,’ &c.) to encompass the complexity and nuance therein ultimately come 
together to create this confusion and misunderstanding laden picture of emotion and how 
45 Austin, J. L. ​Philosophical Papers​, 115 - 116. Oxford: Clarendon, 1961. Print. 
46 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. ​Zettel​, 220. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. Ed. G. H. Von Wright. Berkeley: U 
of California, 1967. Print. 
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we talk about it; but nowhere in this idiosyncrasy riddled confusion is there space for the 
notion that we misunderstand and mislabel emotion because it exists apart from its 
outward symptoms. We must not look at the dark clouds and lightning and say “look, 
signs of a storm. 
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